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Richard A. Easterlin, Robert A. Pollak,
and Michael L. Wachter
This paper develops a general model of marital fertility, from which,
with appropriate empirical restrictions, implications are drawn for re-
search and welfare analysis. The model builds to a considerable extent
on prior economic research, but it differs from much of the economic
literature on fertility in its emphasis on endogenous preferences and
natural fertility. We feel there is need for a formal statement of such a
model to serve as an alternative to the "Chicago-Columbia" approach
that dominates the current work on economics of fertility (e.g., Schultz
1974). Throughout the paper we shall frequently contrast our frame-
work with this approach. The first section outlines our argument; the
second presents a formal statement of the model; the third classifies
fertility determination into four special subcases; the fourth discusses
some of the general research implications; and finally, an outline of the
welfare implications of our model is contrasted with those of the Chi-
cago-Columbia approach.
2.1 (}verview
In section 2.2 we will present a general model of the determinants of
marital fertility and completed family size. The determinants are seen as
working through a family's preferences for consumption, children, and
fertility regulation, and through four constraints:
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1. a budget constraint that reflects the limitations implied by the
market prices of goods and services, the wage rates of family members,
any nonlabor income, and the time at the disposal of household mem-
bers;
2. the household's technology, which enables it to convert market
goods and the tiine of family members into the basic commodities that
are the arguments of its utility function;
3. a "births function" or "fertility production function" that expresses
the number of live births as a function of frequency of intercourse,
reproductive span of the household, fertility regulation practices, and
the commodities, goods, and practices that govern the probability of
conception and the nonsusceptible period of the wife;
4. an "infant" mortality function that expresses infant and child
mortality through adulthood as a function of such variables as health
and nutrition. Subtracting mortality from fertility gives completed fam-
ily size.
Maximizing the utility function subject to the budget constraint, the
household's technology, the births function, and the infant mortality
function yields the optimal solution values for the household's decision
variables. We denote the optimal solution values for births by bO and for
completed family size by N°.
The model is presented (as in the Chicago-Columbia approach) in a
single-period decision-making framework. Parents are viewed as making
their basic fertility decisions at the beginning of the marriage and then
not altering their behavior over their lifetimes. This requires, however,
a distinction between results perceived or anticipated when the decisions
are made and the actual outcomes. The distinction reflects the fact that
families may not correctly perceive the constraints of the maximization
problem. The theoretical model of section 2.2 is developed in terms
of perceived magnitudes. Conceptually the model can be altered in a
straightforward manner to deal with the actual results. This is an impor-
tant consideration, since the empirical data are usually for the actual
rather than the perceived concepts.
In developing a general model of fertility determination, we concen-
trate on two considerations that we believe are empirically important
but that have been largely ignored in much of the economics literature.
First, a family's utility function, whose arguments include a vector of
commodities and completed family size, is viewed as endogenous to the
society in which it lives. In our model this relationship is incorporated
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through an interdependent preference mechanism, which allows for the
transmission of aspirations from one family to another and from one
generation to another. Past behavior, whether in a "socialization" or a
purely intrafamily framework, determines a family's tastes. Second, a
family does not always understand or acknowledge the relationship be-
tween its fecundity and its consumption decisions because it lacks
accurate information concerning the determinants of births and infant
mortality. The composition of the consumption bundle has both a direct
effect on utility and an indirect effect that operates through the births
production function. When household decisions fail to recognize the
fecundity effects, in part or in full, there is a problem of "unperceived
jointness."
Interdependent preferences and the births and infant mortality func-
tions, with a given level of unperceived jointness, enrich and complicate
the optimal solution function. For example, as we shall see, maximizing
the family's utility function subject to the appropriate constraints does
not yield demand functions for completed family size (or births) as gen-
erally construed in the literature.
Needless to say, practical application of such a model is constrained
by the limited amount of available data. On fairly reasonable assump-
tions, however, various subcases of the general model can be distin-
guished and estimated. Although they are not necessarily realized in
pure form, we think these subcases may often constitute useful approxi-
mations to reality. In section 2.3 we develop this classification scheme
and discuss its empirical relevance.
The concepts of desired fertility and natural fertility play a central
role in our classification scheme. The concepts, although prominent in
empirical demographic research, have received little attention from econ-
omists. We make these concepts an integral part of our analysis. Desired
fertility, bd, is defined as the number of births a family would choose
in a situation termed by demographers a "perfect contraceptive society"
(Bumpass and Westoff 1970); that is, one in which the family has ac-
cess to a contraceptive technology with no economic costs and free of
preference drawbacks.
Natural fertility, bn, is defined as the number of births a family be-
lieves it would have if it made no deliberate attempt to influence its
fertility. Natural fertility is less than the biological maximum and is
consistent with the existence of "social controls" on fertility, such as an
intercourse taboo. It constitutes uncontrolled fertility only in the sense
that the family itself makes no deliberate effort to influence its fertility.
Contraceptive devices are not utilized, and unperceived jointness or
social taboos or both exclude other methods of deliberately influencing
family size. If families did perceive the relationship between their con-
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order to change their fertility. Conscious and deliberate variations by
families in the level of their fertility, however, are not compatible with
the concept of a natural level of fertility. From the standpoint of the
family, bn is constant and is independent of its family-size preferences.
Natural fertility may be greater than, less than, or equal to desired
fertility; that is, a family's desires may range from more to fewer chil-
dren than it thinks it could produce if its fertility were uncontrolled. If
the solution for births is below the family's perceived natural fertility
(bO < bn), then it practices deliberate fertility control. An optimal solu-
tion for births above the desired level (bO > be!) implies the existence
of "excess" or "unwanted" fertility, as the term is used in the demo-
graphic literature.
We utilize our generalized fertility model and the associated concepts
of natural and desired fertility to classify societies or populations within
societies into several categories. The categorization is useful in that it
implies restrictions on the coefficients of the variables that appear in the
optimal solution functions. Some groups, especially in less developed
countries, may be at or close to their natural fertility levels. These
groups can be divided into two subcategories. First there are those that
lack the motivation to practice fertility regulation because desired fer-
tility is greater than or equal to the optimal solution. Second, there are
those, again largely in less developed countries, where the economic
costs or preference drawbacks of fertility regulation outweigh the poten-
tial gains. In both these cases, the determinants of fertility are largely
independe,nt of the preferences for children. "Demand models," with
their emphasis on income and substitution effects, are not relevant. Al-
though income might be a significant determinant of completed family
size, its influence would be unintended and would work through im-
proved nutrition and health, which would lead to increased fecundity
and decreased infant mortality. Demand models tell a different story,
typically suggesting that increases in income lead to an increase in the
number of children demanded. For natural fertility societies, demand
variables-correctly measured and interpreted-are insignificant.
At the other extreme are groups, largely in developed countries, that
can be approximated by the perfect contraceptive society. In this case,
births and infant mortality technology functions are not quantitatively
important determinants of the level of fertility. The properly specified
optimal solution function now contains the preference parameters re-
lated to children and may reflect endogenous tastes and household tech-
nology, including those aspects concerning child-rearing, as well as the
budget constraint.
The general fertility model, which includes endogenous tastes and
the births production function, has implications for a number of impor-
tant demographic questions. We have already indicated its significance8S Toward a More General Model of Fertility Determination
for specifying the optimal solution function in different societies for
different' time periods. It is of particular importance that the parameters
of this function vary systematically in quantitative importance as one
moves along the continuum from less to more developed economies
and/or lower to higher socioeconomic classes within a society. Hence,
elasticities of births and completed family size with respect to their argu-
ments will vary systematically both across and within societies. We shall
also indicate the model's implications for the analysis of the "demo-
graphic transition," long-run fertility swings, secular trends in fertility
in both less developed countries and developed countries, and the wel-
fare benefits of various types of fertility-control programs in different
societies.
At various points we contrast our analysis with the "Chicago-Colum-
bia" approach, by which we mean the line of inquiry exemplified in two
recent special issues of the Journal of Political Economy, since pub-
lished as an NBER volume.1 That there is a distinctive Chicago-Colum-
bia approach to the economics of fertility hardly requires demonstration.
In a review of the volume that brings together the JPE work, Allen
Kelley observes that "the papers are ... largely of one voice, showing a
common perspective to the analysis of economic problems and to a cer-
tain extent a mild intolerance of other approaches to viewing the world
of social and economic behavior" (Kelley 1976, p. 517). As examples
of spokesmen for the approach, one may cite T. W. Schultz (in his
editor's introduction to the JPE volume), Michael Keeley (in a reply
to a critique by Leibenstein), and T. P. Schultz (in several survey arti-
cles).2 We shall draw particularly on the last two in comparing our
framework with the Chicago-Columbia approach, because these articles
provide valuable general discussions of that viewpoint.3
The Chicago-Columbia approach is most simply characterized by
what it emphasizes and deemphasizes. Particular emphasis is placed on
cost factors and on the opportunity cost of a wife's time; little or no
attention is given to taste factors and to the births production function
(the latter relates to what T. P. Schultz calls "supply" factors). T. P.
Schultz asserts that "cross-sectional studies of individual countries at all
levels of development have confirmed the qualitative predictions of this
rudimentary demand theory of fertility" (T. P. Schultz 1976, p. 98).4
Our main reservation about this line of work is that its deemphasis of
tastes and "supply" factors severely limits its empirical relevance. For
developed countries the model is of limited application because it ignores
preference variables. This is most strikingly illustrated by the failure of
the Chicago-Columbia approach to advance an explanation for the recent
fertility swing in the United States.5 For less developed countries, fitting
a "demand" model to data for households whose fertility is largely un-
controlled leads to unwarranted inferences about "demand" elasticities.86 Richard A. Easterlin/RobertA. Pollak/Michael L. Wachter
Furthermore, the subordination of taste considerations lends itself to
dubious conclusions about economic welfare and public policy. Mini-
mizing the importance of tastes makes it easier to draw unambiguous
inferences about the desirability of policies aimed at reducing "un-
wanted" fertility, but the lack of attention to tastes make such inferences
questionable. At the same time, the approach is unlikely to be helpful
to those directing family planning programs, who must make choices
between attempting to alter preferences (for example, by allocating
resources to advertising the benefits of small families) and simply pro-
viding contraceptive information or cheaper services. Hence, we believe
that both the analysis of fertility behavior and of the welfare effect of
government programs requires a more balanced approach, one in which
economic research on preferences and natural fertility takes equal place
with the usual concerns of the Chicago-Columbia approach.
2.2 The Formal Model
In this section we develop a formal framework for analyzing marital
fertility. We begin by summarizing the household production model,
which provides the starting point for our analysis. In the three subse-
quent subsections we modify the household production model to incor-
porate a number of additional variables related to the determination of
marital fertility and completed family size. In section 2.2.2 we incorpo-
rate the basic variables related to fertility into the household production
model by adding two new "production" relations, a "births production
function" and an infant mortality or "deaths function," and then de-
scribe two extensions of this model, one incorporating unperceived
jointness (section 2.2.3) and the other interdependent preferences (sec-
tion 2.2.4).
By unperceived jointness we mean a situation in which the family does
not correctly recognize the relationship between its fecundity and its
consumption or life-style decisions. For example, an increase in non-
labor income might cause an unintended and unanticipated increase in
births through the following chain of causation: the increase in nonlabor
income causes an increase in consumption of health care services or
food, which leads to an improvement in health or nutrition; these in
turn cause an increase in fecundity. The essence of unperceived joint-
ness is that the decision to devote additional resources to improved
health or nutrition rather than shelter or recreation is made without
awareness of its implications for fertility.
By interdependent preferences we mean that the family's tastes are
influenced by the consumption and family-sizt" decisions of other fam-
ilies. In the "socialization" version of the interdependent preferences87 Toward a More General Model of Fertility Determination
model the family's tastes are influenced by the observed behavior of
other families in the society, perhaps those in a suitably restricted socio-
economic group. In the "intrafamily" version, a family's aspirations for
both commodity consumption and family size are influenced by the con-
sumption and family-size patterns the husband and the wife experienced
in childhood and adolescence.
Our model provides a framework for analyzing a number of impor-
tant aspects of fertility behavior, but it neglects a number of others.
First, we deal exclusively with marital fertility. Second, we do not
attempt to explain the determination of age at marriage. Third, our
analysis is based on a single-period planning model in which the family
makes a once-and-for-all decision about its consumption and fertility
at the time of marriage. Those aspects of fertility behavior that are best
understood in terms of a sequential decision-making model-for ex-
ample, the timing and spacing of children-are beyond the scope of the
analysis, although in principle it could be extended this way. Fourth,
our model treats average fertility outcomes as if they were certain to be
realized by the "representative family." That is, we ignore both the dis-
creteness of children and the randomness of the births and deaths func-
tions and focus on the mean experience of a group of identical families.
In general, randomness and discreteness have implications for the aver-
age fertility of families who are not risk-neutral and whose behavior is
therefore sensitive to the variance as well as to the mean outcome. Fi-
nally, we ignore the fact that children come in two sexes and that
parents may have preferences for the sex composition of their families.
Such preferences could be incorporated into a sequential model of fertil-
ity that recognized the role of uncertainty. In such a model one would
expect sex preferences to influence family size, but such preferences
cannot be incorporated into a one-period planning model in any straight-
forward way.G
2.2.1 The Household Production Model
In this section we introduce the standard household production model
that serves as the basis for our subsequent discussion of fertility. The
model is one in which the household purchases "goods" on the market
and combines them with time in a "household production function" to
produce "commodities.'" These commodities, rather than the goods, are
the arguments of the household's preference ordering; market goods and
time are desired not for their own sake, but only as inputs into the pro-
duction of "commodities." The n market goods are denoted by X =
(Xl> ... Xn), and the m commodities by Z = (ZI, ... ZIIl), and the time
allocation vector by t; the vector t records how much time each family
member devotes to market work and to each household activity. Let R88 Richard A. Easterlin/Robert A. Pollak/Michael L. Wachter
denote the household's preference ordering over commodity vectors, and
U(Z) the corresponding utility function.s
We represent the household's technology by a production set, T. Thus,
the "input-output" vector (Z,X,t) belongs to the set T, (Z,X,t) E T, if
and only if the commodity collection Z is producible from the goods
collection X and the time-allocation vector t. We could distinguish those
uses of time devoted to household production activities from those de-
voted to market work and include only the former as arguments of the
household's technology, but it is harmless to include the entire vector,
and we do so for notational convenience. Unless explicitly stated to the
contrary, constant returns to scale and/or the absence of joint produc-
tion are not assumed. If the household derives satisfaction or dissatis-
faction from time spent at various household or market activities, the
times devoted to these activities will appear as components of the vector
Z as well as the vector t. Technically, this is a case of joint production,
since, for example, time devoted to the activity "cooking" is both an
input into the production of a "home cooked meal" and is itself one of
the outputs of the activity "cooking"-an output that may yield a utility
or disutility quite distinct from that associated with eating the meal
itself. Because we have not ruled out joint production, there need not
be a one-to-one correspondence between activities and commodities.
We let tIt denote the total time available to household member h, and
t"8 the time which he (or she) allocates to activity s. Thus, the family's
time constraint may be written as
s _
~ t". = tIl
....=1
h= 1, ... ,H
where S is the total number of market and nonmarket activities and H
the number of household members.
We distinguish between the set of market activities (M) and the set
of household production or nonmarket activities (T). Thus, if Wit de-
notes the market wage rate of household member h, his earnings are
H
given by ~ WIt t"8 and the household's total earnings by ~ ~ w" t"".
Nf.![ 11 _-= 1 sf..1!
We let Jh denote the household's nonlabor income, and write its budget
constraint in the form
Jl
~ Pk Xk < Jh + ~ ~ WIt t".Y
k=l ,,=1 sEM
"Optimal solution values" for the household's decision variables
(Z,X,t) are found by maximizing the utility function U(Z) subject to
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(Z,X,t) E T
8 _
~ t"8 = t"
8=1
h = 1, ...,H
n H
~ Pk Xk < JJ- + ~ ~ w" t"8'
k=1 "=1 8EM
The optimal solution values are functions of the values of the variables
the household takes as predetermined: goods prices, P; wage rates, w;
nonlabor income, p.; and the household's technology, T. The "optimal
solution" is optimal with respect to the household's own preferences,
not necessarily with respect to any general social welfare criteria. The
optimal solution function shows the relationship between the house-
hold's decision variables, (Z,X,t), and the parameters it takes as given,
(P,w,p.;T). The optimal solution function is not a demand function in
the conventional sense, nor does it treat commodity consumption as a
function of commodity shadow prices. Indeed, commodity consumption
and the optimal values of the other decision variables are functions of
the predetermined variables: goods prices, wage rates, nonlabor income,
and the parameters of the household's technology. Commodity shadow
prices (i.e., the partial derivatives of the cost function with respect to
commodities) have played an unduly prominent role in household pro-
duction analysis. The difficulty with treating optimal commodity con-
sumption as a function of commodity shadow prices is that commodity
shadow prices reflect not only the constraints which the household faces,
but also its preferences. With joint production, commodity shadow prices
depend on the household's tastes as well as on goods prices and the
household's technology. Our model of fertility builds on the household
production model, but we reject the "commodity shadow price" ver-
sion.10
2.2.2 The Simple Fertility Model
In this section we extend the standard household production model
to include a number of variables related to fertility: children ever born
(b), infant and child deaths (d), completed family size (N), frequency
of coitus (a), the reproductive span of the household (A), the length of
time over which each fertility control technique is practiced (8) and
the "intensity" with which each is practiced (1"), and a vector of "prac-
tices," such as lactation (1), which affect either the number of children
born or their chances of survival.
To simplify the notation we shall not introduce subscripts to distin-
guish among fertility regulation techniques, but the framework we de-
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pIe, if one of the available techniques is a contraceptive pill that is to be
taken daily, e might represent the number of months during which it is
taken and T the ratio of the number of days on which the pill is taken
to the number on which it is supposed to be taken.ll Similarly, we do
not use subscripts to distinguish among "practices"; formally, we inter-
pret 1 as a vector, but we shall use "lactation" (i.e., the number of
months of lactation following each birth) as an example of the type of
variable we have in mind.
These variables are related to each other and the other variables in
the household production model by two biological "production" rela-
tionships, a births function, B: b = B(a,Z,X,l,e,T,A); and a deaths
function, D: d = D(b,Z,X,l); and by the identity defining completed
family size: N = b - d.
The births function depends not only on frequency of coitus (a) and
the household's fertility regulation practices (e and T), but also on a
number of other variables that are likely to vary systematically from one
society to another and from one socioeconomic group to another within
a society. To take account of the role of factors such as health and
nutrition in determining fecundity, we include the household's consump-
tion of commodities (Z) and its purchase of goods (X) as arguments
of the births function. Practices such as lactation that influence fecundity
are also included; in the case of lactation, a longer interval of lactation
following each birth will, ceteris paribus, imply fewer births, since lacta-
tion inhibits ovulation. The family's reproductive span, A, depends on
age at marriage and age at the onset of permanent sterility. The latter is
almost certainly endogenously determined by variables such as health
and nutrition, but for simplicity we treat the reproductive span as ex-
ogenous.
The child and infant mortality function depends not only on the
population at risk (b), but also on health and nutrition, which are re-
flected in the family's consumption of commodities and its purchases
of goods. A variety of "practices" that influence deaths are captured by
the vector 1, although the components of 1 that influence deaths need
not be the same as those that influence births. The length of the lactation
interval, however, will appear in the mortality function because-in
many'societies, at least-a longer lactation interval is associated with
lower infant mortality.
Both the births function and the deaths function represent biological
"production" relationships. The existence of these biological relation-
ships is quite distinct from the question whether families in either devel-
oped or underdeveloped countries perceive these relationships accurately.
In this subsection we proceed on the assumption that families are fully
aware of the fertility and mortality implications of their behavior. In the91 Toward a More General Model of Fertility Determination
next subsection we drop this assumption of perfect knowledge and intro-
duce the concept of unperceived jointness.
Preferences in the simple fertility model are relatively complicated.
The utility function includes not only commodities (Z) and completed
family size (N), but also infant mortality (d), frequency of intercourse
(a), and the contraceptive variables (e and T). If frequency of inter-
course (a) were not included in the utility function, then abstinence
would be the dominant form of fertility regulation, since it is costless
and completely effective. Similarly, if there were no disutility associated
with infant and child mortality (d), then infanticide might be the sec-
ond-choice technique, since it also provides an inexpensive and effective
method for limiting completed family size. That these techniques do not
playa prominent role in most societies clearly reflects preference draw-
backs rather than economic costs. But it is not only these extreme tech-
niques of population control that entail preference consequences or
drawbacks; the use of any currently available fertility regulation tech-
nique (for a particular length of time and with a particular intensity)
is likely to entail preference effects that may play an important role in
determining not only their time span and intensity of use, but also the
number of births and completed family size. We denote the utility func-
tion by U(Z,N,d,a,1,e,T).12
The budget constraint must also be modified to allow for the cost of
fertility regulation. We assume that its cost is a function of eand T alone
and denote it by p(e,T),13
The optimal solution to the simple fertility model is the set of values
of the decision variables (Z,X,t,b,N,a,l,e,T) that maximize the utility
function U(Z,N,d,a,l,e,T) subject to the constraints
(Z,X,t) E T
h = 1, ... ,R




N = b _d.H
The optimal solution values are functions of the variables the household
takes as given: goods prices, P; wage rates, w; nonlabor income, 1-'-; the
household's technology, T; the births function, B; the deaths function,
D; the cost function for fertility regulation, p; and the family's reproduc-
tive span, A.1592 Richard A. Easterlin/Robert A. Pollak/Michael L. Wachter
2.2.3 Unperceived Iointness
In this section we modify the simple fertility model by postulating
that the household is not aware of all the ways its consumption and
expenditure patterns affect fecundity and infant mortality. The resulting
model is one in which consumption patterns affect realized fertility and
mortality, but the effects are unintended. Consider, for example, a family
that is not practicing fertility regulation: if it is unaware of the relation-
ship between nutrition and fecundity, it will allocate its expenditure
between food and other goods without taking account of the marginal
impact of better nutrition on births. An increase in nonlabor income
would lead to greater expenditures on food, and, ceteris paribus, through
better nutrition to greater fecundity. But the effect on births would be
an unintended consequence of the consumption pattern corresponding
to a higher income; the household's allocation of expenditure between
food and other goods had nothing to do with its desire for children.
The family might regard the unintended increase in fertility as a blessing
or a curse; in either case, however, the family could "do better" in terms
of its own preferences if it knew the true relationship between nutrition
and fecundity. If the family were aware of the true relationship it could
allow for it in allocating its expenditure between food and other goods:
a family that wanted more children would allocate more to food, while
one that wanted fewer children would allocate less. We use the phrase
"unperceived jointness" to describe a situation in which the family does
not recognize the true relationship between its consumption pattern and
its fertility or infant mortality.16 In this section we formalize the concept
of unperceived jointness and examine its implications for marital fertil-
ity and completed family size.
Although the definition of unperceived jointness does not formally
presuppose a situation in which the family makes no deliberate use of
fertility control, the concept is useful primarily in such cases. It is espe-
cially useful in the first two of the special cases we described briefly in
section 2.1: that is, families who fail to recognize that their consumption
and expenditure patterns have any effect on their fecundity and who do
not employ deliberate fertility control techniques either because they
expect to have fewer children than they desire or because, although they
expect to have more children than they want, the economic costs and
preference drawbacks of fertility regulation outweigh its advantages.
Unperceived jointness is a powerful concept with a wide range of
potential applications to topics other than fertility. For example, health
or various narrowly defined health states can be treated as commodities
that are affected by many household activities, and it is plausible that the
effects of many of these activities on health states are unknown to
the household. The assumption that the household correctly perceives93 Toward a More General Model of Fertility Determination
the relationship between diet and health is an uncomfortable one, espe-
cially in cases where the experts do not agree on the nature of the rela-
tionship or have learned of it only recently. Unperceived jointness allows
us to recognize that health is related to many aspects of a family's con-
sumption pattern and life-style without assuming that the household is
fully aware of these relationships. Although we apply the concept of
unperceived jointness only to the births production function and the
infant mortality function, it could be applied to the household's knowl-
edge of other aspects of its technology. In the fertility context, we could
apply it to the length of the reproductive span, A, but for simplicity we
shall continue to treat the reproductive span as exogenous.
Unperceived jointness does not imply complete ignorance; families
may know a great deal about the effects of their behavior on fertility
and infant mortality. Indeed, unperceived jointness is consistent with
any assumption about the family's knowledge other than the traditional
assumption of perfect knowledge. If we view the family's knowledge of
the relationships governing fertility and mortality as a point on a con-
tinuum from complete ignorance to perfect knowledge, then unperceived
jointness is present everywhere except at the polar case of perfect
knowledge.17
We denote the perceived births function by BCa,Z,X,l,e,T,A) and the
perceived deaths function by DCb,Z,X,l). The simplest specification of
the perceived deaths function corresponds to the assumption of com-
plete ignorance and is one in which the mortality rate is a constant, inde-
pendent of the family's consumption and expenditure pattern CZ,X)
and its practices Cl): DCb,Z,X,l) = 8b. For example, the family might
believe that one out of every four Cor one out of every four hundred)
of its children will die, but it does not believe that its behavior can alter
this mortality ratio. The family's perception of the mortality rate might
depend on the experience of other families in the society, or on that of
other families of similar socioeconomic status.
The simplest specification of the perceived births function is also one
of complete ignorance, one in which births are independent of the fam-
ily's decision variables, at least when the family is not practicing any of
the fertility control techniques specified by ce,T). This implies a per-
ceived births function of the form f3Ca,Z,X,l, O,O,A) = B.18 The family
believes that Cif it does not practice fertility regulation) its fertility will
be exogenously determined and that B children will be born to it. The
family's estimate of B might reflect its observations of the experience of
other families in the society or that of other families of similar socio-
economic status.19
Completed family size is by definition the difference between births
and deaths. In the polar case of complete ignorance, for a family not
practicing fertility regulation, perceived completed family size is given94 Richard A. Easterlin/Robert A. Pollak/Michael L. Wachter
by (1 - S)B. Actual births, deaths, and family size may depart from
these expected levels and are determined by the actual births and deaths
functions; hence, the actual values of these variables depend on the
family's consumption pattern and on other family decision variables
such as those grouped together as "practices" and on frequency of inter-
course.
Beyond the simplest case of complete ignorance, we must face the
question of how families form expectations and adjust the perceived
births and deaths functions in the light of experience and observation.
Similar problems, however, arise in any version of the household produc-
tion model unless we assume that the household has perfect knowledge
of its technology. If a family recognizes that its consumption and expen-
diture patterns affect its fertility, it seems plausible that it would sys-
tematically revise the perceived births function to reduce any gap be-
tween observed and expected fertility corresponding to any consumption
pattern. But such revisions are not possible within the confines of a
one-period planning mode1.20
With unperceived jointness there are two analogues of the "optimal
solution." The first, the "optimal perceived solution," which we denote
by the superscript p, is the vector of decision variables obtained by max-
imizing the utility function subject to the perceived constraints. The
optimal perceived solution corresponds to the values of the births and
deaths functions the household expects, not the levels that would be
generated by substituting the household's consumption and expenditure
patterns into the true births and deaths functions. The second, the "re-
alized solution," which we denote by the superscript r, is the vector of
decision variables obtained from the optimal perceived solution by re-
placing the perceived values for births, deaths, and completed family
size by the values of these variables that would be generated by the true
births and deaths functions, evaluated at the optimal perceived values
of the other variables. In the case of goods purchases and the commodity
consumption pattern, the realized solution coincides with the optimal
perceived solution.21 But the realized solution for births and deaths
typically differs from the optimal perceived solution when there is un-
perceived jointness.
Formally, the optimal perceived solution to the model with unper-
ceived jointness is the set of values of the decision variables {Z,X,t,b,d,
N,a,l,e,T} that maximize the utility function U(Z,N,d,a,!,e,T) subject
to the constraints
(Z,X,t) € T
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We denote the optimal perceived solution values by {ZP,XP,tP,bP,dP,NP,
aP,lp,ep,rP}; these values are functions of the variables the household
takes as given: goods prices, P; wage rates, w; nonlabor income, p.; the
household's technology, T; the perceived births function, B; the per-
ceived deaths function, D; and the cost function for fertility regulation, p.
The realized solution coincides with the optimal perceived solution
for the variables (Z,X,t,a,l,e,r), but the realized solution for the demo-
graphic variables (b,d,N) is determined by substituting the optimal per-
ceived solution values of the other variables into the true births and
deaths functions:
Nr = br _ dr.
A fulfilled-expectations equilibrium is a solution in which the realized
values of band d coincide with the optimal perceived values. This does
not imply that in a fulfilled-expectations equilibrium the family knows
the true births and deaths functions-only that its predictions of band
d are correct. It need not know the effects of changes in X or Z on
births or deaths, and it may even believe that b and I) are exogenously
given.22 If births and deaths were truly exogenous, then equilibrium
could be reached only through the revision of beliefs about the births
and deaths functions. When they are not exogenous, the adjustment
toward a fulfilled-expectations equilibrium involves both changes in per-
ceptions and changes in behavior that change the realized levels of
births and deaths. In equilibrium, observing the fertility and mortality
experience of the family will not cause another family holding similar
beliefs to revise its perceptions of these functions.23
2.2.4 Taste Formation
In this section we introduce endogenous tastes into our model of
marital fertility. Within our one-period planning model, interdependent
preferences-that is, preferences that depend on the consumption and
family-size decision of other families-are the only admissible specifica-
tion of endogenous tastes.24 Such preferences are endogenous to the96 Richard A. Easterlin/Robert A. Pollak/Michael L. Wachter
society, but not to the family itself. The model of interdependent prefer-
ences is greatly simplified when it is driven by the past rather than the
current consumption and family-size decisions of other families; because
the lagged specification is at least as plausible as the simultaneous one,
we shall rely on it exclusively.25
Two versions of the lagged interdependent preferences model are of
particular interest. The first is a model of "socialization," whose simplest
specification is one in which each family's preferences depend on the
average consumption and family size of all families in the previous gen-
eration or cohort. This specification can be modified by restricting the
relevant group of families to those with a particular social or economic
status, or by allowing consumption and family-size patterns in the more
distant past to playa role in the formation of tastes. The second version,
the "intrafamily" model, is one in which each family's preferences are
determined by the consumption and family-size patterns the husband
and wife experienced during their childhood and adolescence. The intra-
family version predicts that differences in consumption and family-size
patterns within a group of families that are similar with respect to such
economic variables as wage rates and nonlabor income as well as such
variables as education, social status, and religion will be systematically
related to differences in the consumption and family-size patterns ex-
perienced by husbands and wives during childhood and adolescence.
The socialization version does not imply the existence of any systematic
differences within such a group of similar families. The intrafamily spec-
ification is a version of interdependent preferences rather than habit
formation, because tastes depend on the consumption and family-size
decisions of the husband's parents and the wife's parents rather than on
their own past consumption decisions. Within the context of lagged in-
terdependent preferences, the socialization and the intrafamily specifica-
tions are competing hypotheses about whose past consumption and
family-size patterns determine a family's tastes.
The socialization model of interdependent preferences is essentially
that presented in Pollak (1976b) in a traditional demand analysis con-
text. The intrafamily version has been put forward by Easterlin (1968,
1973) and by Wachter (1972b, 1975) as an explanation of the recent
fertility and labor force participation rate swings in the United States.
The intrafamily version is somewhat more complicated than the sociali-
zation model because its specification requires a notation that associates
each family with the corresponding "parent families" in the previous
generation. Rather than introduce such a notation, we shall discuss only
the socialization specification.
We formalize interdependent preferences by postulating that each
family's tastes depend on "normal levels" of commodity consumption
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the past consumption and family-size decisions of other families. Nor-
mal levels can sometimes be interpreted as "aspiration levels" or "bliss
points," sometimes as "necessary" or "subsistence" levels. The essence
is that the normal level of a variable is positively related to the family's
preference for the commodity in question or for children, so that, ceteris
paribus, one would expect an increase in the normal level of a variable
to increase its level in the optimal solution.
We shall not specify an explicit form for the family's utility function,
but we assume that its tastes for commodities and children are non-
negatively related to the corresponding normal levels.26 Since the fam-
ily's preferences depend on normal levels of consumption and family
size, we denote its utility function by U(Z,N,d,a,l,e,T;Z*,N*). The
semicolon separating the normal levels of z* and N* from the other
variables is intended to indicate that this utility function corresponds to
a preference ordering over the variables (Z,N,d,a,l,e,T), which depends
on the value of the normal variables, not to a preference ordering over
the extended set of variables (Z,N,d,a,l,e,T,Z*,N*). A preference order-
ing over the variables (Z,N,d,a,l,e,T) that depends on the values of the
normal variables is called a "conditional preference ordering," while a
preference ordering over the extended set of variables is an "uncondi-
tional preference ordering."27 The distinction between conditional and
unconditional preferences plays a crucial role in the analysis of welfare
implications in section 2.5.
From a formal standpoint, normal levels are simply parameters that
influence preferences in a nonnegative way toward the variables in ques-
tion. In some cases (e.g., the linear expenditure system) we can inter-
pret them as "necessary" or "subsistence" levels, while in others (e.g.,
the additive quadratic utility function) they have plausible interpreta-
tions as "bliss points," "target levels," or "aspiration levels." However,
there are some situations in which neither interpretation is appropriate.
28
To complete the socialization version of the interdependent prefer-
ences model, we must specify how the normal levels N* and z* are
determined by past levels. We shall present only the simplest specifica-
tion, one relating normal levels to average levels in the previous genera-
tion. That is, we let Z and N denote average levels of Z and N in the
previous generation and postulate that z* and N* are given by z* =
EZ(Z) and N* = EN(N). The short-run behavior implied by the inter-
dependent preferences model differs from that implied by the model
with constant tastes described in section 2.2.3 in that average past con-
sumption and family size, Nand Z, operate through the normal levels
N* and z* to determine preferences. The analysis of the effects of
changes in prices, wages, nonlabor income, or the household's technol-
ogy presents no new issues. By hypothesis, an increase in a particular
li increases Zi*' and one would expect this to cause an increase in the98 Richard A. Easterlin/Robert A. Pollak/Michael L. Wachter
optimal solution value of Zi; similarly, an increase in N will increase N*,
and one would expect a corresponding increase in the optimal solution
level of N.
The "optimal solution" to the endogenous tastes model is a set of
values of the decision variables (Z,X,t,b,d,N,a,l,e,T) that maximizes the
utility function U(Z,N,d,a,l,e,T;Z*,N*) where
Z* = pet)
N* = EN(N),
subject to the constraints
(Z,X,t) E T
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The optimal solution values are functions of the values of the variables
the household takes as given: goods prices, P; wage rates, w; nonlabor
income, po; the household's technology, T; the births function, B; the
deaths function, D; the cost function for fertility regulation, p; the vari-
ables that determine the normal values for commodities and family size,
Z and N; and the family's reproductive span, A.
2.3 Special Cases
The framework we have sketched views fertility as the outcome of
maximizing a utility function subject to four constraints: the budget
constraint, the household's technology, the births production function,
and the infant mortality function. Needless to say, empirical application
of such a model is constrained by the limited amount of available data.
On certain assumptions, however, subcases of the general model can be
identified, some of which are much simpler than the complete model.
In section 2.3.1 we develop a classification scheme distinguishing four
special cases of fertility determination. We show that under certain as-
sumptions the preferences for children may play no role in explaining
fertility; under others, the births production function and infant mor-
tality function may play no essential role, and completed family size is
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household technology-that is, by the variables traditionally emphasized
in economic analyses of fertility. Section 2.3.2 takes up the empirical
relevance of the proposed classification scheme. The evidence presented
suggests that in the typical less developed country, observed fertility for
the bulk of the population may depend on the simple model in which
preferences for children play no essential role in determining completed
family size, but that in developed countries the situation tends increas-
ingly toward one in which preferences playa central role and the births
production function and the infant mortality function play no essential
role. In section 2.3.3 we develop some implications of this scheme for
research on cross-sectional differentials and time-series trends in fer-
tility.
2.3.1 Special Cases of the General Model
Two concepts, prominent in the demographic literature, are of central
importance in the development of our classification scheme-desired
fertility, br!, and natural fertility, bn•
The definition of desired fertility involves another notion common in
the literature, that of the "perfect contraceptive society" (Bumpass and
Westoff 1970). In terms of our framework this is a situation character-
ized by a contraceptive technology with no economic costs and free of
. oU oU
preference drawbacks (that IS, p(8,T) = 0 and as = OT = 0). The
term "perfect contraceptive technology" is sometimes used in the litera-
ture interchangeably with "perfect contraceptive society." We prefer the
latter, because the former conveys the notion of a situation involving
only technological aspects of fertility regulation, whereas clearly subjec-
tive preferences are also involved.
Desired fertility, br!, is defined as the number of births a family would
choose in a perfect contraceptive society. Desired fertility is independent
of the births production function, but it does not depend solely on pref-
erences: other constraints facing the household, its budget constraint,
its technology, and its infant mortality function will all influence desired
fertility. Although there is no real-world perfect contraceptive society,
we believe there are families in a number of societies that effectively
approximate such a situation in that further reductions in the economic
costs and preference drawbacks of fertility control would have no effect
on their fertility behavior.
Natural fertility, bn , is defined as the number of births a family be-
lieves it would have if it made no deliberate attempt to influence its
fertility. It is the value of the births function when its arguments are
determined without regard to preferences concerning family size.
The natural fertility case thus assumes that unperceived jointness or
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duction function except the fertility control variables relating to contra-
ception and induced abortion, which take on zero values. As in the case
of the perfect contraceptive society, we do not argue that the pure case
of natural fertility is often observed; instead, we argue that it is a useful
empirical approximation.
Natural fertility, as we have defined it, is quite different from a bio-
logical maximum level of fertility. Natural fertility will almost certainly
fall below the maximum value of the births function because a house-
hold's consumption pattern involves deficient health or nutrition or be-
cause there are social practices (e.g., with regard to nursing children)
that restrict the output of children. In addition, natural fertility is influ-
enced by many facets of the family's behavior. For example, the level
of natural fertility may reflect such factors as observance of an inter-
course taboo, coital frequency, and the consumption bundle chosen by
the family. The central point, however, is that natural fertility is inde-
pendent of the household's preferences for children; although its prefer-
ences for commodities and practices play a major role in determining
the values of the arguments of the births production function, the rele-
vant decisions are made without regard for their effect on fertility.
Both behavioral and biological factors shape natural fertility. The
issue with regard to behavioral influences is whether the behavior is
consciously motivated, at least in part, by considerations of its effect on
fertility. If it is not, then such behavioral influences are consistent with
natural fertility. The question of the household's motivation is clearly
important for predicting the likely response to a policy intervention. If,
for example, a family has no motivation to regulate its fertility, there
is little reason to suppose that establishing a government family planning
program would elicit a response from the population.29
We also assume for empirical purposes a constant level of infant
mortality that is independent of preferences. This is more troublesome
than the comparable assumption applied to the births function, because
households are likely to realize that they have some control over infant
mortality through their expenditures on children's food and health care.
Our assumption is that the degree of social control over these variables
is great enough that individual family discretion is not empirically im-
portant in altering fertility or completed family size. On this assumption,
Nn, the natural level of completed family size, as well as bn, natural fer-
tility, is independent of family preferences.
The concepts of desired and natural fertility can be used to identify
four special cases of fertility determination. Natural fertility may be
greater than, less than, or equal to desired fertility; that is, a family's
desires may range from more to fewer children than it thinks it could
produce if its fertility were uncontrolled. An optimal solution for births
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vation to practice deliberate fertility regulation. An optimal solution for
births above the desired level (bO > bd) implies the existence of "excess"
or "unwanted" fertility, as these terms are used in the demographic lit-
erature. Using these concepts of deliberate fertility control and excess
fertility, households can be classified into four groups on the basis of the







No bO < bd
Yes bO > bd
Yes bO > bd
No bo = bd
Practice of Deliberate
Fertility Control
No bO = bn
No bO = bn
Yes bO < bn
Yes bO < bn
For those in group I, natural fertility is less than or equal to desired
fertility. In this "deficit fertility" situation there is no motivation to limit
fertility, and hence actual fertility will depend on the determinants of
natural fertility.
In contrast, all households in groups II, III, and IV have a motivation
to regulate fertility because their natural (or "uncontrolled") fertility
would result in a greater number of births than desired (bn > bd ).
Whether these families practice fertility control depends on the economic
costs and preference drawbacks of control relative to its anticipated
benefits.
For those in group II the economic costs and preference drawbacks
of fertility control outweigh the benefits, and no deliberate control is
practiced. For this group, then, as for group I, actual fertility equals
natural fertility. Families in group II differ from those in group I, how-
ever, in that natural fertility is greater than desired fertility; hence,
families in the two groups will respond differently to changes in the
economic costs or preference drawbacks of fertility regulation.
Households in both group I and group II do not deliberately attempt
to influence their fertility-group I, because of lack of motivation; group
II, because the economic costs or preference drawbacks outweigh the
incentive. In both cases, therefore, observed fertility behavior corre-
sponds to the natural fertility level and is independent of preferences
for births.
For group III the benefits of fertility regulation outweigh the eco-
nomic costs and preference drawbacks, and these families practice fer-
tility control. But the economic costs and preference drawbacks of
fertility control are such that these families have "excess fertility" in
the sense that the number of children called for by the optimal solution
exceeds desired fertility. Hence, for families in group III: b" > bO > b
d
•
For this group, preferences for commodities and children and all of the
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tion, the budget constraint and the household's technology-enter into
the determination of actual fertility. The identification of the factors that
distinguish families in group III from those in group II is of substantial
interest, since these are the factors that push households across the
threshold of fertility regulation and cause them to adopt deliberate fer-
tility control.
For group IV the economic costs and preference drawbacks of fertil-
ity control are so low relative to motivation for control that the group
regulates its fertility to the point where actual births are equal to desired
births. Thus, for group IV we have b" > bO = bd• Strictly defined, no
individual families are in group IV because no perfect contraceptive
society exists. However, we believe that a sizable number of families in
developed economies are close enough to this case that it provides a
useful empirical approximation.30 For such families the level of fertility
is independent of the births production function.
A simple illustration may clarify our classification scheme. Consider
a population of households identical in all respects except for nonlabor
income and the preference drawbacks of fertility control. Suppose that
there is only a single composite commodity, Z, one unit of which is pro-
duced from each unit of market goods. Consider the indifference map
of economic theory with b measured along the horizontal axis and Z
along the vertical axis. The curve labeled bd in figure 2.1 is the "expan-
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showing the amount of z and b that would be demanded as nonlabor
income varied, given tastes and prices. Each point on the curve is ob-
tained from the tangency of an indifference curve and perceived feasible
set. One may think of the values of b for various assumed levels of non-
labor income, thus derived, as the "Engel curve" for births-that is,
how births would change with the level of nonlabor income. As drawn,
the curve shows the number of births increasing with nonlabor income,
implying that births are a normal good.
Let us now consider how the ability of households to produce live
births might vary with the level of nonlabor income if no deliberate
attempt were made to regulate fertility. If nonlabor income were ex-
tremely low, then health and nutrition might be so poor that a household
would be effectively sterile, that is, b = O. Higher levels of nonlabor
income (implying higher input values of health and nutrition in the
births production function) would, up to some limit, imply increasing
numbers of births. The bn curve of figure 2.1 traces the path that the
potential output of births is assumed to take as nonlabor income grows;
that is, it shows how natural fertility might vary with income.
Consider now households whose income is so low as to place them to
the left of point m. For these households, desired fertility, bd , is greater
than their reproductive ability, bn. Hence they would have as many
births as they could, and their actual fertility would correspond to nat-
ural fertility. These are our group I households; observations for this
group would fall along the b" curve, as shown by the "c" values in the
figure.
All households to the right of point m are in an "excess supply" situ-
ation; their reproductive potential, bn , exceeds their desired fertility, bd•
Differences in the actual fertility of these households would arise only
from differences in their nonlabor income and the size of the drawbacks
they attach to fertility control, because all other factors are assumed to
be the same for all households. Households that perceive the drawbacks
as so great that they do not practice deliberate fertility control will have
observed fertility equal to natural fertility; such households are in our
group II, and the observations for this group fall along the bn curve, as
illustrated by the "x" values in figure 2.1. For households who view the
preference drawbacks as negligible, observed fertility will equal desired
fertility; these households are in our group IV, and the observations for
them all along the bd curve (illustrated by the "v" values in fig. 2.1).
Finally, households that practice some deliberate control, but for whom
the drawbacks are so great as to result in some excess fertility, will fall
in the shaded area between the bd and bn curves; these are the group III
households.
For some populations the entire bn curve could lie to the left of the
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served fertility equal to natural fertility. For other populations, the
relevant part of the bn curve might lie wholly to the right of the bacurve,
and if obstacles to fertility control were negligible, all households might
fall in group IV, with observed fertility equal to desired fertility. Typi-
cally, however, one would expect most societies to include a distribution
of households ranging from group I through group IV. When this is so,
if one plotted the observations for the population as a whole, one would
obtain a scatter of points corresponding to the c, x, and v values as well
as some that fall in the shaded area.
If all fertility-determining functions were known, there would be no
difficulty in explaining variations among households in observed fertility.
When full information is lacking, we suggest using survey response data
to divide the population into four groups based on the concepts of nat-
ural and desired fertility. For those falling in groups I and II a births
production function can be estimated, reflecting the effect of income
changes on natural fertility. For those in group IV, it is appropriate to
ignore the births production function. For those in group III, we require
a model involving preferences for children and fertility control as well
as the births production function and infant mortality function.
2.3.2 Some Evidence
Within our general model of fertility determination we have identified
four special cases. The empirical evidence currently available, although
limited, suggests that it is analytically useful to emphasize these special
cases.
The most important evidence relates to the distinction between so-
cially controlled and family controlled fertility (groups I and II versus
groups III and IV). For demographers and sociologists, the absence of
deliberate family control of fertility is unlikely to raise serious questions,
because most noneconomists think of premodern populations as pri-
marily "natural fertility" regimes. Economists, however, are predisposed
toward viewing behavior, including reproductive behavior, as a matter
of conscious choice. For example, in work on agricultural production
behavior in peasant societies, the trend of research has been toward
establishing the applicability of rational decision-making models. Thus
it has been shown that an unfavorable price movement for a product
influences production decisions and causes a contraction in the acreage
of the crop planted, in a manner consistent with the predictions of deci-
sion-making models (Behrman 1968). By the same token, one might
suppose that a decrease in the returns from child labor might lead to
curtailment of the output of children.
Reproductive behavior, however, differs from production behavior in
an important respect. Babies, since they are a product of sexual inter-
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rice and wheat do not. Hence, a decision to limit fertility typically re-
quires conscious action, such as abstinence, contraception, or induced
abortion. If reproductive behavior is a matter of deliberate choice, then
one would expect to find evidence of deliberate practice of fertility
control. In fact, the evidence points to the general absence, rather than
presence, of deliberate fertility control in less developed countries.
The evidence available is of two types-survey data in which house-
holds report on their knowledge and use of fertility control, and census
or other data on actual age-specific marital fertility rates.3! The former
come mostly from what are known as "KAP" surveys-surveys of the
knowledge of, attitudes toward, and practice of fertility control-which
have been conducted in a number of countries since World War 11.32
The other body of data relating to the presence or absence of con-
sciously controlled fertility is quite different; here one draws inferences
from the actual fertility behavior of the population, instead of relying
on subjective responses. The procedure requires brief exposition, al-
though the essential idea is a simple one.
If no conscious effort were made to limit family size, the age pattern
of marital fertility would be governed largely by fecundity and would
show a slow decline from ages 20-24 through 35-39, then drop sharply
thereafter. If couples were consciously limiting family size, the age pat-
tern of fertility would tend, as age rises, to diverge increasingly in a
negative direction from the natural fertility pattern. This is because
when a young couple is at the start of the family-building process, there
is little incentive to regulate fertility, and hence actual fertility would
tend to coincide with natural fertility. However, as a couple ages and
family-size grows, approaching or exceeding the desired level, the incen-
tive for deliberate action to restrict family size increases, and correspond-
ingly so does the incentive to adopt deliberate control measures; if such
measures are adopted, one would observe the gap between actual fertil-
ity and natural fertility increasing over time.
Building on this notion, deriving from Louis Henry's work, that de-
liberate control involves behavior affecting fertility that is modified as
parity increases, Ansley Coale has recently developed a summary index
of fertility control, "m," that measures the extent to which an observed
age pattern of fertility departs from that believed to characterize a nat-
ural fertility regime. An important advantage of the Coale measure
(defined in the note to table 2.2) is that it rests on observed behavior,
not subjective responses to an interviewer. Moreover, Coale's index
would reflect any technique of deliberate control, including abstinence,
withdrawal, lactation practices, and induced abortion. In this respect, it
avoids two possible problems in the survey data-the possibility that
some techniques of deliberate control may have been omitted from the
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disadvantage is that the Coale measure, unlike survey data, would fail
to register a growth in deliberate control if it occurred uniformly at all
reproductive ages, for the measure is premised on the assumption that
when deliberate control is common, the fertility of older married women
is especially low relative to the fertility of younger women. Both a priori
reasoning and experience suggest that this is usually true, but the full
empirical significance of this qualification remains to be established.34
Clearly, one may have doubts about either body of evidence-house-
hold surveys of fertility control or inferences from observed fertility
behavior-as an adequate indicator of the extent of deliberate fertility
control. However, if the results from the two sources are mutually con-
sistent, this would significantly enhance the credibility of each. In fact,
as comparison of tables 2.1 and 2.2 shows, this proves true.
Both sets of data show quite limited practice of fertility control in
most countries at a premodern or early modern stage of development.
In table 2.1 the proportion of the population in such areas reporting
that they have ever attempted to control fertility is often about 10% or
less. In table 2.2 the index of fertility control, which can range from
values about zero (virtual absence of fertility control) to about 2.0, is
usually about 0.25 or less.35 In contrast, in contemporary developed
countries, both measures show substantial practice of deliberate con-
trol.36
The two sets of data also show similar results with regard to rural-
urban differences in fertility control. Uniformly, the practice of fertility
control is higher in urban than in rural areas.
Finally, for the one case, Taiwan, for which data were readily avail-
able for a comparison of the changes over time in the two measures,
they show a quite similar trend. In figure 2.2, Coale's index of fertility
control is plotted for three dates, 1956, 1965, and 1973. The 1956 value
is just about zero, which means that the age pattern of fertility in Tai-
wan at that date was almost identical with that of a natural fertility
regime. Subsequently the index rises sharply to 1965 and again to 1973,
implying the rapid adoption and spread of deliberate control. For the
last two dates we can compare this pattern with the results of KAP
surveys. At each date the survey value is approximately one-half that of
"m," and the trend (broken line) lies very close to that shown by the
Coale index. Although this is a very simple comparison and the female
populations covered by the two measures are not identical, the closeness
of the trends indicated by the two measures is encouraging.
Thus we have two bodies of evidence that are mutually confirming-
one drawn from personal reports on the knowledge and practice of fer-
tility control and the other based on inferences from observed behavior.
It appears that households are, in fact, behaving as they say they are.
In most less developed countries, this means that a large proportion ofTable 2.1 Percentage of Married Women of Reproductive Age Currently
Using Contraception, Developed and Developing Countries,
Recent Dates
Country Date National Rural Urban
A. Developed Countries
Australia 1971 66
Belgium 1966 76 70 77
Czechoslovakia 1970 66 59 69
Denmark 1970 67 64 69
England and Wales 1967 69
Finland 1971 77 79 76
France 1972 64 59 65
Hungary 1966 64 64 65
Netherlands 1969 59 43 64
Poland 1972 57 51 62


















Pakistan 1968-69 6 4 10
Philippines 1972 8
Taiwan 1971 44
Thailand 1969-70 13 42
Turkey 1968 35 25 65
Latin America
Colombia 1974 31 19ft 35ft
Costa Rica 1976 34
Dominican Republic 1976 24
Ecuador 1974 3





Trinidad and Tobago 1971 44
Source: Nortman (1977), tables 2 and 7.
ft1969. Data are for those ever using contraception.Table 2.2 Coale Index of Fertility Control, m, for Females 20-49,
Contemporary and Historical Western Populations and Asian




National Rural Urban Capital
Population Date m Date m m m







B. Historical Western Populations
Bulgaria 1901-5 .02
Denmark ca. 1865 .26 ca. 1865 .24 .25 .56
Finland 1871-80 .24
Norway 1871-75 -.05 1910-11 .31 .86
Sweden 1751-1800 .23
6 north French villages 17th-18th cent. .00
7 south and central French villages 17th-18th cent. .02
14 northwest French villages 17th-18th cent. .03
8 Germanicvillages 17th-18th cent. -.00
1 Swedish village 1745-1820 .13
Quebec 17th cent. -.06
C. Asian Populations
Japan 1925 .21
Korea 1961 .03 1960 .01 .36
Malaysia 1957 .25
Pakistan 1963-65 -.24
Philippines 1963-67 .19 1963-67 .69
Sri Lanka 1953 .44
Taiwan 1956 -.02 1961 .16 .29 .66
Thailand 1960 .11 1968-70 .15 .47 .58
Indonesia 1965-70 .17 .28
Mysore, India 1952 .26 .16 .56
West Malaysia 1967 .27 .32 .97
China (rural) 1930 .06
Comilla (Bangladesh) 1963-64 .13
4 Japanese villages 17th-19th cent. .18
Hong Kong 1961 .61
Singapore 1957 .30109 Toward a More General Model ofFertility Determination
households are not deliberately regulating their fertility and thus fall in
groups I and II of our classification scheme.
The discussion so far relates to evidence of the division of the popu-
lation between groups I and II versus groups III and IV. There are no
published data that permit the classification of a population into our
four groups-a cross-classification based on the practice of fertility con-
trol and absence or presence of excess fertility-and hence judgments
on empirical importance of the individual groups must be more tentative.
However, in the case of Taiwan, for which the availability of unpub-
lished data permit us to derive at least an illustrative distribution of the
population among all four groups, the results suggest that all four groups
were important in 1965.
The data contain various biases, such as inadequate recall and a ten-
dency after the fact to adjust one's view of desired fertility to realized
fertility. Nevertheless, the results shown in table 2.3 may provide a
rough idea of orders of magnitude of the four groups at that time. In
1965, the population is divided fairly evenly among the four. For 30%
(group I), the number of children was less than or equal to that desired,
and consequently, there was no incentive to practice fertility control,3;
Another 26% (group II), although in an excess fertility situation, had
not resorted to fertility control, presumably because the costs or prefer-
ence drawbacks of such control exceeded its benefits. The total of these
two groups together amounts to 56%, a majority of the population. The
observed fertility behavior of this segment of the population reflects the
operation of social controls but not of deliberate family control of fertil-
ity; its fertility behavior is independent of preferences for children. The
remaining 44% of the population had resorted to deliberate control.
This group was almost equally divided between those who had excess
fertility (group III), 21 %, and those who had not (group IV), 23% .
Source: A, unpublished data kindly provided by Ansley J. Coale; Band C, Knodel
(1977, tables 1 and 2), except 1960 data for Korea, which were also provided by
Coale.
Note: The index of fertility control, m, is calculated from a comparison of the
age-specific marital fertility schedule in the subject population with that presumed
to characterize a natural fertility regime according to the following formula:
r(a) =M X n(a) X em·v(a),
where
a stands for age (from 20-24 through 40-49)
n(a) is an empirically derived natural fertility schedule
r(a) is the marital fertility schedule of the subject populations
M is a scale factor equal to the ratio of r(a) to n(a) at ages 20-24, and
v(a) is an empirically derived function expressing the typical age pattern of vol-
untary control of fertility.
See Coale and Trussell (1974, p. 187) and Knodel (1977, n. 12).110
2.0






Fig. 2.2 Coale index of fertility control, "m
H
, and survey responses
on deliberate contrcl, Taiwan, 1956-73. Index values from
Knodel (I977, fig. 5). Survey data from KAP 1 and KAP 4
surveys (ct. table 2.3).
In sum, these data suggest that all four groups in our classification
scheme may be empirically important at certain times and places. What
stands out most clearly is the importance of social as opposed to delib-
erate family control of fertility in many less developed countries. Evi-
dence of a pervasive lack of knowledge and use of deliberate fertility
control relates especially to rural areas in less developed countries. Since
the rural sector typically comprises such a large proportion of a less
developed country's population, this means that the l'ehavior over time
of the national average of fertility may be largely dominated by the
behavior of a natural fertility population. The evidence does not indi-
cate a total absence of deliberate family control of fertility, but it does
suggest that such control is usually very limited among premodern and
early modern populations.
2.3.3 Research Implications
Our four-group classification scheme, to the extent it has empirical
relevance, has important implications for research. First, it implies that
for cross-sectional analyses the population should be subdivided based
on survey questions regarding deliberate fertility control and excess
fertility, and the resulting groups should be analyzed separately. For111 Toward a More General Model of Fertility Determination
households in groups I and II, natural fertility models stressing the
births production function and ignoring preferences for children are
appropriate. For those in groups III and IV, preferences playa crucial
role, and we view hypotheses regarding tastes as a high priority area for
future research. Our viewpoint is illustrated below in regard to the
analysis of fertility differentials and trends.
Fertility Differentials
Our classification scheme suggests that the cross-sectional pattern of
fertility differentials by socioeconomic status for a national population
is a weighted average of the patterns for the component groups. Pooling
the data for all groups is unlikely to lead to correct identification of the
underlying relationships. On the other hand, disaggregation of the data
into the component groups and separate analysis of each should clarify
the basic relationships.
Let us illustrate in terms of a hypothetical example. Suppose that for
households in groups I and II, those whose behavior is governed by
natural fertility conditions, there would typically be a mild positive rela-
tion between socioeconomic status and fertility around a fairly high
Table 2.3 Percentage Distribution by Practice of Fertility Control and
Deficit or Excess Fertility, Wives Aged 35-39 of Unbroken
Marriage, Taiwan, 1965
Practice of Deliberate Fertility Control
Never Practiced Ever Practiced
Total Desired Family Size Total Desired Family Size
GreaterThan Less Less Equal
or Equal to Than Than to
Actual Actual Actual Actual
Total (group I) (group II) (group III) (group IV)
100 56 30 26 44 21 23
Source: KAP 1 and KAP 4 surveys. We are grateful to Ming-cheng Chang, Ron-
ald Freedman, and Albert Hermalin for making these data available to us and for
help in interpreting them. The specific basis for classification is:
1. Excess fertility: the excess for each respondent of living children over the
ideal number of living children.
2. Practice of fertility control: based on replies to the question whether the re-
spondent "ever used any birth contro!."
Because our concern is with marital fertility, the data shown refer to wives, not to
all women, and, in order to eliminate the effect on fertility of marital disruption,
to wives whose marriage has not been broken. For those who are at an early stage
of the reproduction process, one would expect that desired fertility would exceed
natural fertility. Hence the data are for women aged 35-39 (the oldest age group
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average level of fertility.3s Such a pattern might result from the impact
of higher income and better health working through the births function.
This is illustrated by the groups I-II curve in figure 2.3. Assume further
that for households approximating the conditions of a perfect contra-
ceptive society (group IV) there would be a zero correlation between
fertility and socioeconomic status around a low average level of fertility
-perhaps because systematic variations in taste or cost factors offset a
positive income effect. This pattern is suggested by some data on desired
family size in the United States. This is shown by the group IV curve
in figure 2.3. Finally, let us suppose that for households in group III
the pattern of fertility differentials is dominated by differences in the
adoption of fertility regulation practices, which are perceived by those
in higher socioeconomic status groups to involve fewer preference draw-
backs. Then for this group we have a relation between socioeconomic
status and fertility given by the group III curve in figure 2.3.39 The over-
all pattern of socioeconomic status-fertility differentials would in these
circumstances be a weighted average of the patterns for the component
groups. By appropriate variations in the underlying assumptions one
could produce a great variety of fertility-socioeconomic status patterns.
Ferlillty
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Hypothetical fertility differentials by socioeconomic status.113 Toward a More General Model of Fertility Determination
Fertility Trends
In this area, the most important research questions relate to the de-
mographic transition-the factors behind the shift from high to low
fertility during socioeconomic development-and to the long-term out-
look for fertility in now-developed countries.
Our classification scheme is compatible with, although it does not
require, a view of the demographic transition as a shift from a primarily
natural fertility regime (groups I and II) to one eventually largely
comprising a "perfect contraceptive society" (group IV), an interpreta-
tion consonant with much of the demographic literature. An illustration
is provided in figure 2.4, which shows some hypothetical trends during
"modernization" (i.e., the transition from a premodern to a modem
society) in the levels of natural fertility, desired fertility, and the optimal
solution. In the diagram, the process of economic and social moderni-
zation is assumed to be correlated with increasing family income and
corresponds to a movement to the right along the horizontal axis. The
diagram represents only the general nature of the possible relationships
during modernization; no implication is intended regarding specific mag-
nitudes.
Natural fertility is assumed to increase during social and economic
development, then to level off. This reflects the effect of, for example,
increasing income on the health and nutrition of mothers and children,
which operates through the births function to increase fertility. Desired
family size is assumed to trend downward during the demographic tran-
sition, owing perhaps to a change in tastes or to a relative increase in
the prices of the inputs required for child-rearing. As drawn, the dia-
gram implies that in premodern societies natural fertility is less than
desired fertility (that is, most households are in group I), but the analy-
sis would be essentially the same if most households were in group II.
The main point is that initially there is no deliberate practice of fertility
regulation.
Consider the trend in the optimal solution implied by our assumptions
about natural fertility and desired fertility. At points to the left of m,
the optimal solution coincides with natural fertility: parents would have
no motivation to practice fertility regulation even if it were free of eco-
nomic costs and preference drawbacks. At points to the right of m, de-
sired fertility is less than natural fertility, and families would practice
fertility regulation if it were available without economic costs or prefer-
ence drawbacks.
Since fertility control has economic costs and preference drawbacks,
we anticipate that initially, as natural fertility edges above desired fertil-
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Fig. 2.4 Hypothetical trends in fertility variables associated with
economic and social modernization.
its costs, and the optimal solution continues to coincide with natural
fertility. As the movement to the right continues, excess fertility and the
welfare loss to the family associated with it becomes larger, and a point
is reached at which the benefit of fertility control exceeds its economic
costs and preference drawbacks. At this point, the "threshold" of fertil-
ity regulation, labeled h in the diagram, the family adopts fertility con-
trol. Beyond h, the optimal solution no longer coincides with the natural
fertility curve; instead, the optimal solution curve turns downward in
the direction of the desired births curve, and, eventually, beyond point
p, merges with it.
In terms of the previous classification of the population, the situation
to the left of point m corresponds to a group I situation-no unwanted
fertility and no practice of fertility control-as shown in the space be-
neath the diagram. Between points m and h there is a group II situation
-excess fertility but no practice of fertility control. Between points h
and p there is a group III situation, and to the right of point p, a group
IV situation. Thus, one might think of the fertility transition as an evo-
lution from a group I situation to a group IV situation. Actually, as we115 Toward a Morc General Model of Fertility Determination
have seen, at any given time the households in a population are distrib-
uted among groups I through IV. More realistically, therefore, one might
say that in the course of modernization a society gradually shifts from
a predominantly group I (and/or group II) situation to a predominantly
group IV situation. The main point isthat there is a shift in the nature
of fertility determination from one where natural fertility factors are
largely or wholly dominant and preferences regarding fertility play vir-
tually no role to one in which the influence of natural fertility disappears
and conscious choice plays the dominant role.40
2.4 Research Implications
Although the four cases identified in section 2.3 depend on special
assumptions, a number of other research implications follow from our
general model. In this section we discuss the use of preferences as ex-
planatory variables; some issues involving the births and household
production functions; and the estimation of elasticities of births and
family size with respect to income variables and the wife's wage rate.
Our discussion does not depend on the special cases of section 2.3, al-
though it is sometimes explicated more easily by reference to them. To
bring out the distinctive features of our approach, we contrast it with
the Chicago-Columbia view.
2.4.1 The Role of Preferences as Explanatory Variables
The arguments in section 2.3 regarding the prevalence of unperceived
jointness and social taboos suggest that the role of preferences for chil-
dren in determining observed fertility is smaller in less developed than
in more developed countries. Hence, a section devoted to preferences
must emphasize issues more relevant to the latter.
In the interplay between preferences and constraints, the Chicago-
Columbia approach assumes that systematic variations in fertility are
due largely if not entirely to differences in the constraints. Preferences
are assumed to be constant across households in cross-sectional studies
and over time. Partisans of the Chicago-Columbia approach are gener-
ally opposed to investigating taste formation. An example is provided
by Michael and Becker (1973, p. 380): "For economists to rest a large
part of their theory of choice on differences in tastes is disturbing since
they admittedly have no useful theory of the formation of tastes." Going
further, Keeley (1975, p. 462) argues that "the household production
model lessens the reliance on tastes by incorporating socioeconomic
variables in the technology of household production and thus provides
a framework where the effects of socioeconomic variables on the shadow
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A related view is that of T. P. Schultz, who asserts that "however
conceptualized and quantified, the influence of these 'taste' factors can
be properly assessed only after the tangible pecuniary returns have also
been isolated and taken into account" (Schultz 1976, p. 95, n. 3; empha-
sis added). But unless one works exclusively with subsamples in which
all households have identical tastes, the attempt to isolate "pecuniary
returns" must fail. Since one cannot perform controlled experiments,
there is no way to segregate the effects of price and income changes
from the effects of habits or other types of endogenous taste formation
if these phenomena are actually taking place. Hence, estimates of price
and income effects obtained from a specification that presupposes fixed
tastes are conditional on the maintained hypothesis of fixed tastes. In
demand analysis, for example, introduction of habit-formation not only
improves R2 but also changes the estimates of price elasticities, income
elasticities, and marginal budget shares.41
The notion that economists have an acceptable theory of systematic
differences in household technology, but do not have a definitive theory
of taste formation, is hardly a justification for excluding or neglecting
hypotheses related to tastes.42 Indeed, economists do not have very sat-
isfactory theories of systematic differences in technologies available to
firms in different regions, and the problems posed by household tech-
nologies are substantially more difficult because the outputs are often
not measured directly. In any case, the testing of alternative models
should be left to the empirical arena and not settled by a priori argu-
ments about the proper scope of economics, demography, or other social
sciences.
We advocate research on the effect of tastes along with other deter-
minants of variations in fertility. For example, our own work suggests
that models incorporating systematic changes in tastes are capable of
providing an explanation of recent fertility swings in the United States
and some other developed countries.43 The Chicago-Columbia approach,
on the other hand, has been unable to provide a satisfactory explanation
of this experience. The Chicago-Columbia approach emphasizes that
children are "time intensive in household production." Continuing ad-
vances in female education continue to raise the real wage of the wife
and consequently the opportunity cost of child-rearing. In this frame-
work, fertility in developed economies should then trend monotonically
downward once a regime of low infant mortality is established. Impor-
tant swings in fertility rates are not anticipated or explained.
In contrast, an endogenous preference mechanism leads to different
implications for the long-term outlook in developed countries. Over the
long term, it is possible that income growth may be fertility-neutral in
the sense that shifts in the budget constraint favoring children are offset
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of income growth that disfavors children. (This is suggested in fig. 2.4
by the leveling off of the bet curve, once, say, a low infant mortality
regime is established.) These two influences however, may differ in their
timing effect and consequently generate longer-term fluctuations in fer-
tility. In this view, recent observations of total fertility rates below the
zero population growth level in the United States may be a low point
on a long-swings cycle rather than the continuation of a secular decline
owing, for example, to increasing female wage rates that increase the
cost of child care.44
A framework that incorporates research on taste formation along with
other social and economic variables will extend the range of empirical
problems potentially amenable to treatment. In addition, it may forestall
possibly biased results in analyses that omit taste consideration. For if
preference variations enter into the determination of fertility variations
along with variations in included variables such as wage rates, then
failure to take simultaneous account of taste factors will lead to biased
estimates of the effects of changes in the included variables.
2.4.2 The Technology of Child-rearing
Central to the Chicago-Columbia approach is the assumption that, as
a technological datum, child-rearing is time intensive. Despite its impor-
tance, however, there has been little research on the technology of child-
rearing. The lack of progress in this area may be due to two factors: the
lack of measurable outputs that can be associated with child-rearing and
the difficulties of distinguishing between the effects of technology and
those of tastes in child-rearing behavior.
We would argue that while children today may be time intensive,
especially in their early years, this results from the interplay of tastes,
technology, and the budget constraint. There is little evidence to support
the notion that the technology requires child-rearing to be time inten-
sive, independent of prices and tastes.
An analysis of the child day-care industry could highlight some of
these factors. Has the growth of day-care centers been solely due to a
shift in techniques of child care resulting from an increase in the oppor-
tunity cost of the wife's time, or has the development of this industry
also been due to a change in attitudes toward child-rearing and the role
of women? Taking these factors into account, one could develop a
number of scenarios in which child-rearing might cease to be a time-
intensive activity for the household. For example, if the day-care indus-
try were at an "infant" industry stage (no pun intended), its develop-
ment, viewed as a dynamic process, could lead to a substantial reduction
in the price of child care outside the home. This would lead to a substi-
tution in favor of day-care centers and a decline in household time
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wife's wage rate. Similarly, a change in preferences in favor of day-care
centers as a desirable way to rear children would lead to a decline in
household time devoted to child-rearing, although the change might be
unrelated to any changes in market prices or wage rates. In these situa-
tions it is far from certain that fertility rates would continue to decline,
or even remain low, as income and female wages trended upward.
When dealing with the technology of child-rearing, the Chicago-Co-
lumbia school tends to treat commonly used socioeconomic variables
such as education as proxies for inputs of the household technology.
For example, Michael (1973) assumes that differences in education
among individuals cause differences in household efficiency but have no
effect on tastes. In this framework, the anticipated relationship between
education and family size depends upon the relative gains in efficiency
in consuming different "commodities" including children. Since the
model does not lead to a priori restrictions on the sign of the coeffi-
cients, it cannot be separately identified from the preference effects that
include educationY' Is it not possible that education operates through
both preferences and technology?
2.4.3 Births Production Function
Another important line of research suggested by our general model is
the investigation of the births production function. This is especially
important for less developed countries where observed behavior for a
substantial share of the population is typically governed by a natural
fertility regime. Research on the births production function might be of
interest for developed countries, but it would be more difficult because
of the smaller proportion of direct observations available.
Suppressing the fertility regulation variables 8 and T, the births pro-
duction function used in section 2.2 is of the form b = B(a,Z,X,l, A).
Since observations on frequency of intercourse, a, are usually not avail-
able, and taking the reproductive period, A, as given in an analysis of
marital fertility (i.e., focusing on women with the same age at marriage),
one would focus on the second and third terms of the relationship, the
vectors Z and I. A number of suggestions on relevant empirical vari-
ables are available in the literature. Perhaps best known is the line of
research stimulated by Rose Frisch (1975), which hypothesizes a posi-
tive relation between nutrition and fertility. To date, the most thorough-
going attempt to test this notion in a context of less developed countries
is that of Anderson and McCabe, who find supporting evidence for a
biological relationship between nutrition and fertility among younger
women in Kinshasa, Zaire (Anderson and McCabe 1975). Another
fundamental factor that often receives attention is health conditions.
Romaniuc, for example, in a study of data for districts of the Congo,119 Toward a More General Model of Fertility Determination
concluded: "the evidence points definitely to the existence of a sequence
of events one would logically expect to occur. The birth rate is low
because of the high incidence of sterility; the latter is caused by venereal
disease, the incidence of which varies with the degree of sexual promis-
cuity" (Romaniuc 1968, p. 233). In Ceylon, malaria eradication appears
to have had a positive effect on births (Barlow 1967). Among other
factors (not necessarily independent) that figure in the literature as de-
terminants of natural fertility are lactation practices (Jain and Sun
1972), cultural norms such as intercourse taboos (Leridon 1977), occu-
pational circumstances (e.g., fishing or a nomadic life) (Chen et al.
1974; Romaniuc 1974; Henin 1972), and altitude above sea level (Heer
1967; James 1966).
What is needed in the study of the births production function is an
approach analogous to that employed in studying mortality (Auster,
Leveson, and Sarachek 1969). Such work would embrace a variety of
input variables-nutrition, health, and others of the types just men-
tioned-that determine fertility as an output. This approach could ascer-
tain the roles of these variables both singly and in conjunction with
others as determinants of fertility variations.46
As has been noted, in the Chicago-Columbia approach, the prevailing
view is that "demand" models of the type used for empirical research
on developed countries are, with the addition of a child mortality func-
tion, a satisfactory point of departure for empirical research on less
developed countries. (Advocates of a demand approach are not confined
to those working in the Chicago-Columbia tradition.) When discussed
-which is rarely-the need for research relating to the births produc-
tion function is not emphasized. Thus, T. P. Schultz, in defending the
demand model and the disregard of the births production function,
argues that:
If, as seems intuitively reasonable, exogenous differences in a woman's
expected fecundity are not usually correlated with exogenous factors
affecting her demand for births, proxies for exogenous biological fe-
cundity may be omitted from the demand model of fertility determi-
nation and, if this is true, pose no estimation problems [Schultz 1976,
p.93].
We argue that the typical Chicago-Columbia demand model poses a
serious misspecification for less developed economies and that Schultz's
attempt at salvaging the model does not work.4' Most troublesome for
the demand model advocates is that the "demand" variables, properly
interpreted, may simply not be relevant in many less developed coun-
tries, except for explaining family size desires as distinct from behavior.
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practice of fertility control is linked to variations in observed fertility.
In fact, as discussed above, evidence relating both to age patterns of
fertility and to survey responses suggests an absence of deliberate con-
trol among much of the population in a typical less developed country.48
Variables such as income that economists usually interpret as demand
variables may, however, be significant in a statistical sense because of
their effect on births through the births production function. The vari-
ables "fit," but for the wrong reasons. The Schultz argument that the
explanatory variables in the demand and supply models are different,
so that the demand variable coefficients are uncontaminated, is dubious
for the same reason; a woman's fecundity is likely to be positively corre-
lated with income, a factor that also affects her demand for children.
2.4.4 Estimating the Optimal Solution Functions
The empirical fertility literature focuses on estimating the effects on
births and completed family size of certain key explanatory variables
such as nonlabor income and the wife's wage rate. In the Chicago-Co-
lumbia approach, the problem is often treated as one of estimating elas-
ticities (assumed to be constant), and these elasticities are assumed to
correspond to the traditional income and substitution effects that would
be present in a model in which preferences and the techniques of house-
hold production were unchanged.49
In our general model, the effects on births and completed family size
of changes in nonlabor income and the wife's wage rate operate through
at least three distinct lines of causation. Because we are not simply max-
imizing a utility function subject to a budget constraint, the optimal solu-
tion function is not directly comparable to a demand function.
To see this, consider the effect of an increase in the family's nonlabor
income. First, the budget constraint shifts out so that the new budget
line is parallel to the old one, indicating that the family faces a larger
feasible set in the goods space, but that the relative prices of goods are
unchanged. This is a possible analogue of the "income effect" of tradi-
ditional demand theory, although it is not the only possible one. The
outward shift in the budget set in the goods space implies a correspond-
ing outward shift in the feasible set in the commodity space. If the
household's technology exhibits constant returns to scale, then the new
feasible set in the commodity space will be a radial blowup of the old
feasible set. Second, if the household's preferences are not homothetic,
it may choose to consume commodities in different proportions than
before; if this is the case, and if the household's technology exhibits
joint production, then the commodity shadow prices at the new equilib-
rium commodity consumption pattern will differ from those at the old
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of production used by the household. The change in the household's
commodity consumption pattern may affect the household's fecundity,
even though the household is unaware of the relationship between its
consumption pattern and its fertility. Unperceived jointness may operate
on the side of infant and child mortality as well as of fecundity, and
their net effect will determine completed family size. Third, in the long
run, the increase in nonlabor income may lead to an endogenous change
in preferences. In the relative income model, for example, an increase
in income will in the long run alter aspirations and lead to taste-induced
changes in fertility and the participation rate of married women.50
In the general model, a change in nonlabor income will affect fertility
through all three of the mechanisms described above. Disentangling
these separate effects and estimating the underlying structural parameters
is a difficult task given the usual limitations on data and our lack of
a priori knowledge of technology and tastes. This lack of information,
however, does not permit us to assume that induced changes in tech-
niques of production or in tastes are quantitatively unimportant relative
to the traditional income and substitution effects. Indeed, we believe the
available data suggest that the effects that operate through changing
techniques and changing tastes are significant, and that their relative im-
portance varies systematically across societies and across groups within
a given society. Our suggestion in section 2.3 that populations be divided
into four groups whose fertility behavior should be analyzed separately
is our response to this problem. Whether or not one adopts the assump-
tions necessary to classify populations strictly into these four special
cases, the evidence on the practice of deliberate control suggests that for
many less developed societies the response of births to changes in non-
labor income and wage rates will operate largely through unperceived
effects of consumption patterns on the births and infant mortality func-
tions and that preferences for children will not play a quantitatively
important role. For developed economies, on the other hand, response
to changes in nonlabor income and wage rates will reflect preferences
for children (which may be endogenous) and the household's child-
rearing technology as well as the traditional income and substitution
effects of the Chicago-Columbia school.
Regressing wage rates and nonlabor income on fertility does not yield
sensible estimates of the impact of these variables. The bias would be
greater in less developed than in more developed societies, and greater
for lower than for higher socioeconomic groups within a society. One
way to minimize these biases is to divide the population into groups on
the basis of survey responses or income levels and to estimate the pa-
rameters separately for each group. In our four special cases, parameters
related to preferences for children can be omitted for groups I and II,
and those related to the births technology can be omitted for group IV.122 Richard A. Easterlin/Robert A. Pollak/Michael L. Wachter
2.5 Welfare Implications
Our emphasis on unperceived jointness and endogenous tastes re-
quires substantial modifications in the usual formulation of welfare
arguments. But even without unperceived jointness and endogenous
tastes, our stress on the preference drawbacks as well as the economic
costs of fertility regulation as a determinant of fertility control has im-
portant implications for evaluation of the welfare effects of policies
aimed at reducing "excess" or "unwanted" fertility. These issues are
taken up in order below.
2.5.1 Endogenous Preferences
Any type of endogenous tastes considerably complicates welfare anal-
ysis. In section 2.2 we discussed a model of interdependent preferences
in which a family's tastes depend on the consumption and family-size
decisions of others. More specifically, we assumed that each family's
preference ordering over its decision variables-vectors of the form
(Z,X,b,d,N,a,l,e,T)-depend on the "normal values" of Z and N, which
we denote by z* and N*. These normal values might depend on the
consumption and family-size patterns it observes in the surrounding
society (in the socialization version) or on the levels of Z and N ex-
perienced by the husband and wife in childhood (in the intrafamily
version). In section 2.2 we described the preference ordering over the
decision variables as "conditional" on the values of z* and N* and
indicated this by writing the utility function as U(Z,N,d,a,l,e,T;Z*,N*),
with the semicolon separating the normal levels z* and N* from the
other variables. We did this to distinguish between an "unconditional"
preference ordering over the extended set of variables (Z,N,d,a,l,e,T,
Z*,N*) and a "conditional" preference ordering over the decision vari-
ables (Z,N,d,a,l,e,T) that depends on the levels of the normal variables
Z* and N*.
A conditional preference ordering captures the notion that families
with different consumption and family-size experiences may have differ-
ent tastes and may make different decisions, but it does not permit us
to compare situations that correspond to different normal values, z* and
N* .51 Such comparisons must be based on the unconditional preference
ordering over the extended set of variables (Z,X,b,d,a,l,e,T,Z*,N*). To
see this, suppose that preferences for children are determined by the
number of children in the wife's family, independent of the commodity
consumption pattern of that family, in the following very simple way:
regardless of other considerations, the family attempts to have the same
number of children as were present in the family in which the wife grew
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tempting to accomplish this. In such a world, the size of the family in
which the wife grew up uniquely determines the number of children she
will have, but there is nO way to use this information to compare the
welfare level of women with One sibling with that of women with two
siblings. Notice that the woman with One sibling is observed to choose
two children rather than three, while the woman with two siblings is
observed to choose three children rather than twO.52
The welfare implications of a model of interdependent preferences
must be derived from the unconditional preference ordering, but these
preferences are not revealed by the family's choices of the decision vari-
ables. Thus the conceptual basis for welfare evaluation in such a model
must be quite different from the "revealed preference" approach usually
employed by economists. We see two possible bases for welfare evalua-
tion with endogenous preferences. The first is based on direct compari-
SOnS of the well-being of different families as reflected by their responses
to survey questions which ask them directly about their "happiness" or
"well-being."53 The second approach relies on a different type of inter-
personal comparison. Sen (1973, p. 14) discusses this approach:
If I say "I would prefer to be person A rather than person B in
this situation," I am indulging in an interpersonal comparison. While
we do not really have the opportunity (or perhaps the misfortune, as
the case may be) of in fact becoming A or B, we can think quite sys-
tematically about such a choice, and indeed we seem to make such
comparisons frequently.
Representing (x,i) as being individual i (with his tastes and men-
tal qualities as well) in social state x, a preference relation R defined
over all such pairs provides an "ordinal" structure of interpersonal
comparisons.
In the case of interdependent preferences, One would ask a family
whether it would rather be in the position of family A, which experi-
enced the consumption-family-size pattern a during adolescence, or of
family B which experienced the consumption-family-size pattern {3 dur-
ing adolescence, but it is possible that the family's choice between the
alternatives (A,a) and (B,{3) will depend on its Own consumption-
family-size experiences during adolescence. If individuals are unable to
abstract from their own backgrounds and upbringing in making choices
of this type, there is little chance of extracting an unconditional prefer-
ence ordering from responses to such questions. If this is the case, wel-
fare evaluations must rest On direct comparisons of "happiness" or
"well-being" reflected either by responses to survey questions or by an
appeal to general (and often questionable) assumptions about "human
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2.5.2 Unperceived 10intness
Even without interdependent preferences, unperceived jointness com-
plicates welfare evaluation. Economists are accustomed to asserting that
if a family chooses alternative A when it could have chosen B, then A
is at least as good as B according to the family's preferences.55 The
analogous correct version of this assertion is the following: If the family
intends to choose A when it believes it could have chosen B, then A is
at least as good as B (according to the family's preferences). Unper-
ceived jointness breaks the automatic link between observed consump-
tion and intended choice, since the family that intends to choose A may
be observed with A' (e.g., a larger number of children, because of the
effect of better nutrition on fertility). Similarly, with unperceived joint-
ness the household's perception of the set of feasible alternatives may
be quite different from the true feasible set, and inferences about prefer-
ences must be based on the perceived rather than the actual feasible set.
These difficulties of inferring preferences from observed choices in the
presence of unperceived jointness are not restricted to situations involv-
ing nutrition and fertility but apply equally to choices involving diet and
health or transportation and safety, or any other context in which unper-
ceived jointness is present.
Welfare inferences-even welfare inferences based on the family's
preferences-are difficult to make in the unperceived jointness model
because it is difficult to infer the family's preferences from its observed
choices. This is clearly true in the short run, when the number of births
or deaths realized by the family is different from the numbers it expected
on the basis of the perceived births and deaths functions. But it is also
true in the long run, when realized and perceived births and deaths
coincide. The difficulty with revealed preference-type inferences based
on the fulfilled expectations solution is that even in such an equilibrium
the family's perception of its feasible set of alternatives is inaccurate.
2.5.3 Unwanted Fertility
We have defined "excess" or "unwanted" fertility as the difference
between optimal and desired fertility; that is, bO - bd• We are concerned
with two general causes of unwanted fertility, the economic costs and
the preference drawbacks of fertility regulation.56 A reduction in the
economic costs of fertility regulation (e.g., a reduction in the price of
condoms, diaphragms, or pills) represents a clear welfare gain to those
whose excess fertility is reduced. The introduction of a new fertility-
regulation technique (e.g., the pill) also represents a clear welfare gain
for those who choose to use it. However, the welfare evaluation of a
reduction in unwanted fertility due to an increase in the use of contra-
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is more complex. Evaluated in terms of the family's new preferences,
the change is an improvement, but evaluated in terms of its old prefer-
ences it is not. Thus the evaluation of the welfare impact of a govern-
ment program that operates by changing tastes so as to reduce the
preference drawbacks of fertility regulation is necessarily ambiguous.57
The view is common in the demographic literature that reduction or
elimination of unwanted fertility through public policy would increase
welfare. The Chicago-Columbia version of the economics of fertility
lends itself to this view because it minimizes the role of preferences in
determining contraceptive usage and emphasizes the importance of ac-
cess to information and efficient use of a contraceptive technique. Thus
Becker (1960) attributed the high completed family size of poor fam-
ilies to contraceptive failure owing to inadequate information. Similarly,
Michael and Willis (1976) show that in the United States higher levels
of formal education are related to lower contraceptive failure rates. If
this reflects the greater efficiency of these families in fertility regulation,
then a decrease in excess fertility would imply an improvement in the
welfare of a family.
We do not assert that government-sponsored programs to control
fertility cannot be valuable. But we do insist on distinguishing between
benefits that accrue to the families whose excess fertility is reduced and
benefits that accrue to others in the society.58 In evaluating the benefits
to the families whose excess fertility is reduced, it is important to under-
stand the mechanisms through which such programs operate. To the
extent that such programs operate by changing the preferences of the
families whose excess fertility is reduced, there is no clear way to deter-
mine whether the families in question have benefited.5n
A government-sponsored program that reduced unwanted fertility by
lowering the economic costs of fertility regulation clearly benefits fam-
ilies whose excess fertility is reduced, provided the costs of the program
are paid by others (i.e., by other groups within the society or by outside
groups such as the United Nations). If the costs of the program are paid
by taxes levied in part on the group whose unwanted fertility is reduced,
then the question whether their welfare is increased depends on the
balance between the benefits of lowe;-cost fertility regulation and the
costs in the form of higher taxes; there is no presumption that the bene-
fits outweigh the costs.
The strongest case for economic benefits can be made on the grounds
of market failure. The argument for the existence of market failure is
generally based on the fact that information collection and dissemina-
tion is a public or quasi-public good. A governmental unit can internal-
ize both the information costs and the direct costs of establishing a
market, whereas individual families cannot. The information-market-
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of knowledge on the part of families that particular techniques of fertil-
ity regulation are available, a situation that is more likely to exist in less
developed countries than in advanced industrial societies.60
When the reduction in excess fertility is the result of government
proselytizing for the acceptability of contraception in order to reduce its
preference drawbacks, we cannot infer that the reduction in excess fer-
tility implies a welfare gain to the family. Even when the fertility control
program is associated with a reduction in the economic costs of fertility
regulation (e.g., by the free provision of fertility control devices and
associated medical care not financed by taxes levied on those who prac-
tice fertility regulation), welfare gains cannot be inferred if tastes are
changed at the same time.
In evaluating the welfare impact of family planning programs one
must distinguish between developed and less developed countries. Pref-
erence drawbacks and economic costs underlie excess fertility in both
areas, but economic costs are likely to be more significant in less devel-
oped countries, whereas preference drawbacks are likely to predominate
in developed countries. Family planning programs designed to change
preferences regarding the use of fertility regulation may be justified in
terms of their benefit to society as a whole, but it is difficult to argue
that such programs improve the welfare of the families whose tastes they
change and whose excess fertility they thereby reduce. The benefits to
families whose excess fertility is reduced by a government program that
reduced the economic costs of fertility regulation are likely to be consid-
erably smal1er in developed countries than in less developed countries
because the costs of access to information are typically much lower in
developed countries. Most parents know of the existence, availability,
and method of use of "reliable" techniques of fertility regulation (i.e.,
techniques with low theoretical failure rates). Many, however, continue
to report unwanted fertility. Since the economic costs, including infor-
mation access costs, are low in developed countries, the preference draw-
backs must be decisive. Hence the main elements in unwanted fertility
in developed countries appear to involve preference and motivation and
not the economic costs or lack of information about fertility control.
2.6 Conclusion
Although there have been important advances in the analysis of fer-
tility since the pathbreaking work of Becker (1960) and Leibenstein
(1974a), the subject has become increasingly fettered by a narrowing
view of the determinants of fertility. The framework laid out in this
paper is intended to reverse this tendency by emphasizing a number of
neglected determinants of fertility that deserve further exploration. Some
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1. To come to grips with the variety of real-world fertility behavior,
models of fertility determination must be expanded to include prefer-
ences and the biological production relationships. We propose a frame-
work that includes such considerations in section 2.2, where we empha-
size the role of "interdependent preferences" and the "births production
function."
2. This model of section 2.2, although rich in analytical potential, is
complicated, and practical application is limited by the lack of data. On
fairly reasonable assumptions, however, special cases of the model can
be distinguished, ranging from one in which fertility is independent of
preferences for children to one in which the births production function
becomes irrelevant and preferences for children-perhaps endogenously
determined-play a crucial role. These special cases are discussed in
section 2.3.1.
3. Evidence both from household surveys of fertility control practices
and from census and other data relating to actual fertility behavior show
that in many less developed countries deliberate efforts by individual
families to regulate their fertility are rare. Hence the fertility of the bulk
of the population is determined by its "natural fertility." For such coun-
tries, time-series and cross-sectional fertility variations may primarily
reflect determinants of natural fertility rather than desired family size
(see section 2.3.2).
4. Survey data make it possible to subdivide a population into those
who practice deliberate fertility regulation and those who do not. We
believe the analysis of fertility requires that these groups be treated in
different ways. To explain the behavior of those who do not deliberately
control their fertility, models stressing "natural fertility" and ignoring
preferences for children are appropriate. For those who deliberately
control their fertility, models emphasizing preferences for children and
the effects of prices and income on desired family size are appropriate.
Attempting to analyze the fertility behavior of an entire population with-
out distinguishing between those who deliberately regulate their fertility
and those who do not may result in biased estimates of the likely re-
sponse of fertility to changes in incomes or to wider access to modern
techniques of fertility regulation (sections 2.3.3, 2.3.4).
5. There is a need for further research in three relatively unexplored
areas: preferences (sections 2.2.4, 2.4.1), the births production function
(section 2.4.3), and unperceived jointness. Research on preferences
could include both the endogenous formation of preferences for children
and the role of the preference drawbacks of fertility regulation as a
determinant of observed fertility. The investigation of the births produc-
tion function should clarify the effect on fertility of practices such as
lactation as well as such variables as health and nutrition. Of particular
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unperceived jointness. In this case the family does not fully incorporate
into its behavior the relationship between its fecundity and its consump-
tion decisions. Unperceived jointness is a pervasive problem in econom-
ics because individuals are often maximizing without taking account of
the full interrelationships among constraints and between constraints
and preferences.
6. Because our framework embraces a wider range of fertility deter-
minants than the Chicago-Columbia approach, it is consistent with a
greater variety of hypotheses regarding the factors that shape fertility
trends and differentials. For example, it is consistent with an explanation
of the demographic transition in which, in the early stages, an upsurge
in fertility occurs owing to natural fertility factors. It is also consistent
with the possibility that there will be substantial long-term fluctuations
in fertility in developed countries rather than a monotonic downward
trend. The framework also suggests a more cautious approach in evalu-
ating the welfare effect of reducing "unwanted fertility," since its reduc-
tion may reflect a change in tastes (e.g., a reduced aversion toward the
use of certain fertility regulation techniques) rather than a movement
to higher indifference curves on an unchanging indifference map (sec-
tion 2.5).
Notes
I. See Schultz (1974). No single designation for this approach is fully satisfac-
tory. Here we adopt the term used by one of its advocates, Keeley (1975).
2. See Schultz (1974); Keeley (1975), Leibcnstein (1974b), and Schultz
(1976).
3. T. Paul Schultz's article, although published in 1976, was originally prepared
for a 1973 conference. Inevitably, there are differences among members of a
"school" on particular points, and injustice may be done to one or another indi-
vidual in a general discussion. Moreover, there are indications that several of the
leading workers may be venturing in directions we advocate. A recent paper by
Michael and Willis, for example, departs strikingly from the usual Chicago-Co-
lumbia model, and introduces a "natural fertility" concept (Michael and Willis
1976). T. Paul Schultz has encouraged work on natural fertility at the Rand Cor-
poration and has recently given more attention to "biological factors" in a discus-
sion of the relation between infant mortality and fertility. Ben-Porath, whose
identification with the Chicago-Columbia approach is in any event uncertain, has
explored the issue of intergenerational taste influences (Ben-Porath 1975).
4. T. W. Schultz, on the other hand, is markedly restrained in commenting on
the relevance of the Chicago-Columbia approach to less developed countries:
"Turning to fertility behavior in low income countries the [Chicago-Columbia]
household model as it now stands has not been developed to treat the particular
classes of circumstances that constrain the household in these countries. These are
countries in which illiteracy abounds, human time is cheap, and the income oppor-129 Toward a More General Model of Fertility Determination
tunities that women have outside the home are mainly not jobs in the Jabor mar-
ket. Furthermore, infant mortality is high, life expectancy is low, debilitation
during the adult years is substantial for reasons of inadequate nutrition and en-
demic diseases, and the availability of modern contraceptive techniques, including
information about them, is, in general, wanting. These classes of circumstances
are not yet at home in the household model" (Schultz 1974, p. 20).
5. This failure is admitted by both Keeley (1975, p. 466) and Schultz (1976,
p. 94). Curiously, although the value of a relative income model in explaining
this movement is generously acknowledged by these writers, they are not led to
reconsider their general stance against research on preferences.
6. For a discussion of the role of sex preferences in determining family size,
see Ben-Porath and Welch (1976).
7. The seminal paper in the household production literature is Becker (1965).
In Lancaster's model (Lancaster 1966a,b, 1971) goods possess "characteristics" that
are often identified with Becker's "commodities," and the "technology" is linear.
Becker often uses fixed coefficient production functions as an expositional device,
but linear technology is not an integral part of his model. For a recent sympathetic
statement of the household production approach, see Michael and Becker (1973).
For a discussion of some of its limitations, see Pollak and Wachter (1975).
8. It is customary to assume that the household's preferences over the com-
modity space are weIl behaved in the sense that they can be represented by a
continuous utility function that is strictly quasi-concave and nondecreasing in its
arguments. If the feasible set in the commodity space is convex, these assumptions
guarantee that the utility maximizing collection of commodities is unique.
9. The "cost function," C(P,w,z;T), is defined as the minimum cost of produc-
ing the commodity bundle Z with the technology T at goods prices P and wage
rates w. That is,
n H
C(P,w,Z;T) = min ~ PIc x"+ ~ ~ W" t"8'
"=1 11=18'1'
subject to (Z,X,T). T. We can use the cost function to translate the budget con-
straint from the goods space into the commodity space. The translation of the
constraint is the requirement that C(P,w,Z;T) not exceed the family's "full in-
come" (i.e., the household's total earnings if it devoted all of its time to market
work) :
H
C(P,w,Z;T) $ J.l. + ~ w" t".
11=1
10. These issues are discussed in Pollak and Wachter (1975), where it is argued
that joint production is pervasive in household production situations, especially
when the role of time is recognized. For further discussion, see Barnett (1977)
and the reply by Pollak and Wachter (1977).
1I. Formally, it would be possible to treat the same fertility-regulation tech-
nique practiced with different intensities as different techniques. Our formulation
is more consistent with ordinary usage and is capable of casting some light on the
question why some population groups have higher "failure rates" than others using
the same technique.
12. We take the family (more specificaIly, the parents) rather than the indi-
vidual to be the basic unit of analysis. The assumption that the family (i.e., the
husband and wife collectively) has well-defined preferences begs the issue of aggre-
gating the separate preferences of the husband and wife into a collective preference
ordering. Samuelson (1956) provides a classic statement of the problem; Nerlove130 Richard A. Easterlin/Robert A. Pollak/Michael L. Wachter
(1974, p. S 204) describes the resolution of these problems by postulating a "fam-
ily utility function" as the "Samuelson finesse."
13. If the total cost of fertility can be decomposed into a fixed cost, Po(,.), and
a variable cost, PI(,.)0, the cost function takes the form
p(o,,.) =Po(,.)k + PI(,.)0,
where
k =0 if 0=0 and k = 1 if 0 > O.
The cost of fertility regulation might also depend on the fecundity of the fam-
ily, which may in turn depend on its goods purchases and commodity consump-
tion; abortion is an example of a technique whose cost depends on fecundity.
14. The earnings of children could be incorporated into the model either by
expanding it to include an "earnings function" or by interpreting vector t to include
the allocation of the time of children. We implicitly adopt the latter course to
avoid additional notation.
15. Existence of a solution poses no real problems, but uniqueness is a different
matter. We have not ruled out the possibility of multiple solutions. The usual
uniqueness argument rests on the assumptions that feasible sets are convex and
preferred sets are strictly convex. But some of our variables have no "natural"
units of measurement, and there are no market units we could adopt by conven-
tion. For example, given any index of the intensity of use of a particular fertility
regulation technique, any increasing transformation of that index would serve
equally well. But such transformations can alter the convexity properties of feasible
sets and preferred sets, so that the usual type of uniqueness argument cannot be
made. Of course, the uniqueness of the solution cannot be altered by such trans-
formations, and uniqueness is assured if there exist any units of measurement in
which the feasible sets and the preferred sets are both convex and one or the other
is strictly convex. Since we cannot establish uniqueness, we cannot guarantee that
the optimal solutions are continuous in the variables the family takes as exogenous.
16. The term "unperceived jointness" is motivated by viewing the household as
having a single production technology instead of three distinct technologies, one
producing births, another infant mortality, and the third the other commodities.
We call this single technology the household's "generalized technology." This treat-
ment avoids treating births, deaths, and fertility regulation as distinct from the
other commodities by extending the notion of commodities to include all of the
arguments of the family's utility function; we refer to these variables as "gener-
alized commodities." The generalized technology exhibits joint production because
the same inputs affect the output of more than one generalized commodity: for
example, purchased food inputs produce the generalized commodity "nutrition,"
which is desired for its own sake, but they also influence the output of the gener-
alized commodities "births" and "deaths." The assumption that the family is not
fully aware of the relationship between nutrition and births (or deaths) implies
that the jointness in the household's generalized technology is at least in part
"unperceived."
17. The polar cases here are the extreme points on the continuum from igno-
rance to knowledge; they do not coincide with the special cases of the classification
scheme described in section 2.1. Indeed, that discussion assumed "complete igno-
rance" in order to define "natural fertility."
18. Since the family's reproductive span, A, is not a decision variable for the
family, this constant specification is equivalent to B(a,Z,X,I,O,O,A) = (:3/\ where
the family believes that the ratio (:3 is not affected by its decisions. If the reproduc-131 Toward a More General Model of Fertility Determination
tive span were made a decision variable, then the two specifications would no
longer be equivalent, and age at marriage would become a possible mechanism of
conscious and deliberate fertility regulation.
19. For example, B might be equal to the average fertility of the most recent
cohort to have completed its reproductive span, or a weighted average of the ex-
perience of such recent cohorts, perhaps restricted to families of similar socio-
economic status. A more complicated specification might make use of the experi-
ence of families who had not yet completed their reproductive spans. This would
be legitimate even in our one-period planning model, but it would not be legiti-
mate to use the family's own experience or that of other families of its cohort as
a basis for prediction.
20. A one-period planning model cannot capture the behavior of a family that
did not intend to practice fertility regulation, has more children than it expected,
and then begins to practice fertility regulation. Inability to reflect this type of
period behavior is a serious drawback of one-period planning models. Two points
should be made. First, this defect is relevant only for families that have knowledge
of fertility-regulation techniques they would utilize if they knew their true fecun-
dity. Second, the difficulty of incorporating unperceived jointness into the one-
period planning model is a point against the one-period planning model, not
against unperceived jointness.
21. There is a conceptual difficulty here, again reflecting the confines of the
one-period planning model. Presumably, the eventual allocation of expenditure
among goods is determined by realized rather than perceived family size: a family
that expects two children and has four will buy more "child goods" and fewer
"adult goods" than it planned. One can imagine a two-period model in which the
consumption pattern in period one determines realized family size, and realized
family size determines the consumption pattern in period two. In a multiperiod
model, births and mortality in each period would depend on consumption patterns
in previous periods, and consumption patterns in each period would depend on
actual family size and composition in that period.
22. Similarly, in a Cournot duopoly equilibrium each firm correctly predicts
the output of the other firm without perceiving the reaction function that gener-
ates that output.
23. Notice that perceived and realized completed family size could be equal
even if bp ¥= b'· and dp ¥= dr, if there are offsetting errors, but this is not a fulfilled-
expectations equilibrium. We have defined an equilibrium in terms of births and
deaths rather than completed family size because a divergence between perceived
and realized births will cause a revision of expectations about the births function
and a revision of plans.
24. It might be thought that a model of habit formation in which a family's
own past consumption levels influenced its taste for goods would be appropriate,
but such a specification cannot be developed within the structure of a one-period
planning model. For the family's own past consumption experience to playa role,
we need a sequential model in which the family makes decisions at more than a
single decision point.
25. The simultaneous specification in which each family's preferences depend
on everyone else's current decisions is analytically intractable because the prefer-
ences of each family in a particular cohort are determined by variables whose
values depend on the behavior of all families in that cohort. In the lagged specifi-
cation the preferences of each family in a particular cohort depend on the be-
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than a simultaneous structure. With the lagged specification it is only in a "steady
state" equilibrium that the full effects of interdependent preferences manifest them-
selves.
26. The notation of a nonnegative relationship between normal levels and pref-
erences can be formalized as in Pollak (I977, n. 8).
27. This terminology is used in Pollak (1977) to distinguish preferences over
goods (X) that depend on prices (P)-"conditional preferences"-from prefer-
ences over alternative goods-vector-price vector situations (X,P)-"unconditional
preferences." The nomenclature is analogous to that used for conditional proba-
bility.
28. The "necessary" level interpretation works for the linear expenditure system,
provided that certain parameters assume nonnegative values; but there is no a
priori reason to believe that these parameters are nonnegative. For a discussion of
both of these systems and references to the literature, see Pollak (I970, 1971).
29. A word is necessary also on the distinction between "socially controlled"
and "family controlled" fertility. By "family controlled" or "family regulated"
fertility we mean deliberate efforts by individual households to influence their fer-
tility. From this point of view, natural fertility is socially controlled but not family
controlled. For example, an intercourse taboo observed as a matter of cllstom is
a social control that affects the level of natural fertility. It does not, however,
imply controlled fertility in our sense, since observance of the taboo by individual
households is not geared to family-size concerns. For a contrary view, see T. Paul
Schultz (1976, p. 92). It should be noted also that while the present concept of
natural fertility reflects social controls, such controls are only one of a number
of societal conditions that affect natural fertility. War, for example, may reduce
natural fertility by separating spouses, but it would not be viewed as a social con-
trol on fertility.
30. The focus of our approach is on groups or collections of families rather
than on individual families or on society as a whole. This is to avoid both the
problems associated with random or stochastic elements in the births and infant
mortality functions and the discreteness of children. This allows us to interpret our
model as applying to the mean experience of a group of identical families. We do
not assume that all families in a particular society belong to the same group-
quite to the contrary, important aspects of demographic behavior can be captured
only by recognizing the changing balance among the groups we have described.
31. A possible third type of evidence comes from studies in which an attempt
is made to formulate and test hypotheses that distinguish between "behavioral"
and "biological" determinants of fertility. As explained in the preceding section, a
finding in favor of behavioral influences does not necessarily imply controlled
fertility in our sense, since the actual issue relates to whether the behavior is moti-
vated by its possible fertility effect. On the other hand, a finding in favor of bio-
logical influences can be viewed as support for uncontrolled fertility in our sense.
Without pretending to do a systematic survey, our impression is that the results of
a number of these studies lean toward the importance of biological factors. (Cf.,
e.g., Anderson and McCabe [1977], Chowdhury et at. [1976], and Taylor et at.
[1976].
32. A useful early summary report on some of these surveys is Mauldin (1965);
a recent review is given in Nortman (1977).
33. Some surveys aim explicitly for comprehensive coverage of possible meth-
ods. For example, a recent survey in Nigeria asked specifically about traditional
methods, the practice of abstinence, and possible use of extended lactation as ways
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34. A useful discussion of some of the shortcomings of the Henry concept is
given in David and Sanderson (1976, pp. 143 ff.).
35. The index value can actually take on mildly negative values. This is because
the "standard" age pattern for a natural fertility regime is an average of schedules
for ten cases, and a given situation might actually involve a relationship between
the age-specific fertility of older and younger women that is higher than the stan-
dard natural fertility case.
36. See also Knodel (1977). Knodel's paper is especially pertinent to the pres-
ent discussion, for it concludes, from calculations of m, that "modern family limi-
tation (i.e., parity-specific fertility control) was largely absent prior to a secular
fertility decline in both Europe and Asia" (Knodel 1977, abstract).
37. Some additional data may be noted bearing on the prevalence of "excess
demand" situations. Survey data for rural Morocco (1966), West Malaysia (1967),
and Kenya (1966) indicate that among wives 35-49 the proportion who want
more children is substantial, ranging between about one-fourth and one-half. A
recent survey in an area of rural Indonesia states that "despite relatively high
levels of ideal family size (average 4.5) ... , women in Mojalena give birth to
an average of only 3.9 children; moreover, owing to high rates of mortality, com-
pleted family size averages 2.7 children" (Singarimbun and Manning 1976, p. 175).
On the other hand, in Potharam (1964) the proportion was only a tenth or less.
The Morocco data are from Lapham (1970); Kenya, from Heisel (1968); and
West Malaysia, from Palmore (1969). The figures for Kenya include those for
whom the "desire for children" was not ascertained or "up to God," a category
that in rural Morocco accounted for only about 4-6% of the respondents. Indo-
nesian data are from Singarimbun and Manning (1976); the Potharam data, from
Peng (1965). See also Tabbarah (1971).
38. This is a pattern suggested by the data for rural Mysore (United Nations
1961, chap. 10) and more recently by work on Indonesia (Hull and Hull 1977)
and Iran (Ajami 1976).
39. As drawn, this curve lies below that for groups I and II, but one can imag-
ine conditions under which it might lie above it. Clearly, for all of the groups,
identification of typical patterns is itself a research issue.
40. One might imagine a corresponding trend in fertility differentials by socio-
economic status as the nature of the underlying determinants changed. Suppose,
.for example, that the demographic transition involved simply a shift from an
initial group I-group II situation through group III to a wholly group IV situa-
tion. Then t"e initial pattern of socioeconomic status-fertility differentials for the
population as a whole might be given by the positively inclined bl! curve of figure
2.3 above, reflecting the effect of natural fertility factors. When the society was in
the group III situation, the negatively inclined curve would prevail, and in group
IV the horizontal curve. Thus one might hypothesize a trend in fertility differen-
tials by socioeconomic status from positive through zero to negative and back to
zero again. However, this is only one possibility. The point is that the expected
pattern of fertility differentials would shift as the underlying determinants of fer-
tility changed.
41. See, for example, Pollak and Wales (1969), Wales (1971), and Howe,
Pollak, and Wales (1977).
42. Taste differences, like differences in technology, can be and often are used
as a deus ex machina when other explanations fail. But the fact that specifications
involving taste differences (or technological differences) can be misused is not a
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43. See, for example, Easterlin (1973) and Wachter (1975). For other work
on taste formation in a time series context, see Leibenstein (l974b), Lee (1976,
1977), and Lindert (1978). For the application of the relative income model to the
related question of labor force participation behavior, see Wachter (l972b, 1974).
44. See Easterlin (1973), Lee (1975 a,b), and Wachter (1972b, 1974).
45. Indeed, some empirical work suggests that the ceteris paribus relationship
between education and family size is U-shaped. See, for example, Yoram Ben-
Porath (1973).
46. Work at the level of intermediate variables, represented by what are known
as "renewal models," seeks to account for fertility through factors such as age at
sexual union, frequency of intercourse, probability of conception, length of the
nonsusceptible period, and duration of reproductive union. So far as the present
framework is concerneq, this research is of interest primarily for the guidance it
may provide into more fundamental causal factors at work. For example, if the
nonsusceptible period (NSP) is an important source of fertility variation between
two societies, one may be led to inquire into lactation practices, a seemingly im-
portant determinant of NSP and, in turn, into the determinants of these practices.
However, the proximate components of fertility do not each depend uniquely on
different causal factors-for example, a number of the intermediate variables
might be affected by nutrition. An excellent concise presentation of renewal mod-
els is given by Keyfitz (1971). Economists who have followed this lead in recent
work include Michael and Willis (1976), David and Sanderson (1976), and Crafts
and Ireland (1976). Leridon (1977) has recently completed a valuable compre-
hensive survey of the field, which makes accessible in English the pioneering work
of the French demographers, led by Henry and Bourgeois-Pichat.
47. We have avoided here the terminology of "demand" and "supply" models.
As the optimal solution function illustrates, there are no demand and supply
functions in the traditional sense.
48. If one disregards Puerto Rico and Chile, which are uncertain representa-
tives of less developed countries' experience even for Latin America, the studies
cited by Schultz as empirical support for the relevance of the Chicago-Columbia
type of demand approach to less developed areas are: Egypt 1960, Philippines
1968, Thailand 1960, and Taiwan 1964-69. With the exception of Taiwan, the
available evidence indicates extremely low levels of deliberate fertility control in
these countries at the times studied. Table 2.3 shows very low indexes of fertility
control for the Philippines and for Thailand. In Egypt in 1960 the proportion of
married women of reproductive age who had practiced family planning was, in
rural areas, 1.5%; semiurban, 12.0%; and urban, 17.0% (Mauldin 1965, p. 9).
(The rural proportion of the population in 1960 in Egypt was 62.0%.) Even in
regard to Taiwan, as shown in table 2.1 above, in 1965 less than half of married
females aged 35-39 had practiced deliberate control. These observations suggest
that in the studies cited by Schultz a substantial share of the population, and in
some cases almost all the population, is in a natural fertility situation.
49. A good concise exposition is provided in Schultz's appendix (Schultz 1976).
50. See Easterlin (1968) and Wachter (l972b).
51. A similar point is made in Pollak (1976b) in the context of interdependent
preferences, and in Pollak (1977) in the context of price-dependent preferences.
52. Our example assumes a lexicographic preference for family size, but this
is not crucial. Notice that, because the relevant utility functions are conditional
rather than unconditional, we could multiply the utility function of the woman
with one sibling by 100 while leaving the conditional utility function of the woman
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implied by the utility functions, but the admissibility of such transformations shows
that the level of utility cannot be used to compare the satisfaction or well-being
in such cases.
53. See Easterlin (1975) for a survey of results of this type.
54. A third approach, based on the long-run behavior implied by the endoge-
nous taste model, makes use of the "long-run" utility function. This approach was
proposed by von Weiszacker (1971) and criticized on conceptual and technical
grounds by EI-Safty (1976a,b), Hammond (1976), and Pollak (1976a).
55. Strictly speaking, the assertion in the text should refer to an individual
rather than a family, but we assume that families, like individuals, have well-
defined preferences.
56. There is a third source of excess fertility. No fertility regulation technique
(excluding abstinence) is technically perfect even under ideal conditions. Asso-
ciated with each method of fertility control is a minimum failure rate, termed the
"theoretical" failure rate (Leridon 1977, p. 122).
57. A fertility control program which changes preferences for children may re-
duce fertility without reducing excess fertility. This is not an unlikely result.
58. Those whose fertility is unaffected might benefit from a reduction in the
fertility of other groups in the society if the tax and transfer structure caused them
to pay a portion of the cost of the unwanted children.
59. For a more detailed exposition of this argument, see Wachter (1972a).
60. Costs of fixed information and costs of access to fertility control may be
sizable in many less developed countries today. Where modern medicine is not
readily available, the costs of acquiring modern contraceptive techniques can be
prohibitive. For example, parents in a rural village that has neither a doctor nor a
clinic could not import modern contraceptive techniques and associated medical
care except at a very high initial or fixed cost. For these families, the traditional
methods of abstinence and withdrawal may be the only forms of regulation that
can be adopted without violating the budget constraint. To the extent that excess
fertility prevails, the fact that these methods are often not utiIized attests to their
significant preference drawbacks. As development occurs, an increasing proportion
of households in less developed countries have the motivation to practice fertility
control, but the economic costs are too high for modern techniques and the pref-
erence drawbacks too high for traditional fertility regulation. At this stage these
areas offer at least the potential of large economic benefits if the government were
to organize the necessary infrastructure for dispensing contraceptive information
and techniques. The government is in effect capturing an externality by establish-
ing a market for modern contraceptive devices.
Comment Harvey Leibenstein
This is an unusually stimulating paper on a very difficult subject. Its
main features, as I see them, are as follows: (1) It emphasizes and
employs a demographic view of economic development. (2) It contains
a taste-shift factor that is unique for models of this type. (3) It develops
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an interesting concept in the notion of "unperceived jointness." (4) It
separates the demand for children and the demand for controls. (5) In
one sense the model is conventional in that it assumes the maximization
of utility.
Among the clearly desirable features of the model are its introduction
of the taste-shift factor and its use of a demand for controls equation.
It is very difficult to assess the purely demographic view of economic
development. Demographic behavior appears to hang in a void uncon-
nected to economic and social trends. An alternative that might have
been considered is to connect the theory to reasonably uniform patterns
of development of the type studied by Kuznets, Chenery, and others.
For example, fairly specific things can be said about shifts of labor
toward urban areas, increases in education, and shifts in broad occupa-
tional categories, which usually accompany economic development. A
model more explicitly connected with persistent patterns of change
would add a feeling of realism, but it is impossible to say at this point
if it would have greater explanatory power.
An interesting feature of the model is its use of the concept of natural
fertility within marriage as an anchoring point for the predevelopment
situation. The difficulty with this approach is that it omits the marriage
age as a control variable. The view I am espousing is that there are wide
variety of social controls of population even in developing countries,
and, furthermore, that the social controls are substitutes for private con-
trols. The view emphasized is that we must not underestimate the sig-
nificance of the substitution of some controls for others as part of the
process of demographic change.
It may help to keep in mind the following list of population controls:
a. Nonmarriage of women-spinsterhood
b. Late marriage
c. Celibacy rules for some professions
d. Taboos on widow remarriage
e. Periods of noncohabitation
f. Infanticide
g. Neglect leading to infanticide
h. Long lactation periods




We should note that the word used is population rather than fertility.
All population controls are to some degree substitutes for each other.
Some of these controls are social controls, others are individual controls
within the power of family members. But the individual controls are137 Toward a More General Model of Fertility Determination
substitutes for social controls. Hence, if we consider only fertility within
marriage, we may lose some sense of the capacity for substitution be-
tween various types of controls. While the use of the demand for fertil-
ity control in the Easterlin model strikes me as an excellent idea, in
some contexts fertility controls are likely to be substitutes for existing
population controls, and hence a sense of the degree of substitution may
help us assess the net demand for some specific fertility controls.
The concept of unperceived jointness seems extremely useful and is
likely to take care of observed anomalies in the analysis of specific
situations. There is some danger in a concept of this sort, since it is
unlikely to be observable, in that it may be tempting to use it as a
rationalization of any deviation between the results of empirical research
and the predictions from a specific model.
It is understandable that Easterlin, Pollak, and Wachter should use a
utility-maximizing model, since this is the conventional approach among
economists. But this seems to me to be a questionable procedure. First,
it leaves out frequently observed characteristics of behavior-repetitive
behavior and inertia. Second, and most important, it leaves out changes
in degree of rationality as an explanatory factor. In criticizing the maxi-
mization assumption, a question that frequently arises is whether there
is any alternative. In the pages that follow, I shall present the bare
bones of a nonmaximizing model and suggest, albeit quickly and neces-
sarily vaguely, how this model might be used to handle some of the
concepts of the Easterlin/Pollak/Wachter model or related models. Be-
low, a brief comparison is made between the standard theory and the
one I propose, which I shall refer to as general X-efficiency theory.
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The basic assumption behind my theory is that people work out a
compromise between the way they would like to behave, in the absence
of constraints, and the way they would like to see themselves behave in
terms of their standards of behavior, or superego. Under selective ra-
tionality, individuals do not pursue opportunities for gain to the maxi-
mum degree given the constraints, nor do they optimize the pursuit of
information. In other words, they select the degree of constraint concern
their personalities dictate.
The cost of ignoring constraints is a feeling of pressure. This pressure
may be in part the result of ignoring consequences and one's desires to
behave in accordance with one's internalized standards (superego).
Thus, individuals "choose" a compromise position between pressures
and a degree of constraint concern to operate at a psychologically com-
fortable level. This implies, first, that individuals do not necessarily or
usually pursue gains to be obtained from an opportunity to a maximum
degree; and, second, maximizing behavior is a special case in this sys-
tem. The specific compromise an individual makes between the compet-
ing demands of his id (unconstrained desires), and his superego (stan-
dards), on the average, may be viewed as an index of his personality.
If he yields too much to his superego, he will feel pressure to behave
in terms of less constraint, and if he behaves with too little constraint
he will feel the pressure of his conscience. Thus personality and context
select, so to speak, the degree of rationality that will control an indi-
vidual's decision-making (and performing) behavior. The context may
contain strong countervailing pressures to increase the degree to which
an individual approaches maximizing behavior.
Since motivation is extremely important in determining behavior, we
have to take into account interpersonal interactions and especially peer
group interactions that determine the system of approval and disap-
proval, which in its turn influences choices. At the same time, the dis-
tinction between principals and agent is extremely important in such
contexts, since if effort is a variable there is no reason to presume that
the interests of the agent and the principal are identical. Many choices
are carried out by agents, but there is no reason to assume that the agent
puts forth the same degree of effort that the principal would in similar
circumstances.
An important element in our system of analysis is the concept of
inert areas. As its name suggests, this is akin to the notion of inertia.
Individuals are presumed to choose effort positions (a set of related
effort options) in interpreting their jobs or roles in specific contexts. The
basic idea is that once an effort position exists for some time period, an
individual may not shift to a new position even though a gain may be
achieved thereby, because the cost of moving from one effort position139 Toward a More General Model of Fertility Determination
to another is larger than the perceived gain. Thus, individuals may find
themselves stuck within inert areas even though, apart from the cost of
moving, superior effort positions may exist even from the individual's
viewpoint.
In what follows, the idea of inert areas will be used to examine some
of the basic notions in the Easterlin/Pollak/Wachter paper in order to
illustrate how they could fit into a nonmaximizing framework. Given the
space constraints, we can only vaguely suggest how it all works out.
Now inert areas are made up of two components: a segment that ex-
presses some aspects of selective rationality (e.g., ignoring very careful
calculation), and another segment that involves the cost of moving from
one position to another.
Natural Fertility
We may visualize natural fertility as being based on routine behavior
patterns utilizing a traditional mix of population controls. These routine
behavior patterns are presumed to operate within an inert area. They
do not change unless pressure is exerted beyond some minimum level.
Thus, natural fertility would not be interpreted here to imply some
maximal level of fertility, nor would it imply a complete lack of popu-
lation controls, including nonmechanical means of contraception (e.g.,
coitus interruptus); rather, it would imply a situation before the intro-
duction of modern contraceptive means. Thus a situation frequently
found in developing countries before sustained fertility decline could be
fitted into the natural fertility idea. The transition between the natural
fertility state and the partially controlled state would then be observed
as pressure increases sufficiently to induce some people to adopt addi-
tional controls.
Tastes
The concept of the transmission of taste from one generation to an-
other can also be interpreted in terms of the inert area principle. Up to
a point, the inherited taste pattern would persist, but as modernization
creates pressures for new tastes and consequent consumption patterns
that compete significantly with children, we would expect the old tastes
to yield to some degree. Furthermore, we would expect the existing
tastes at anyone time to be the product of inherited tastes as well as
peer-group influences, to the degree that peers adopt modern consump-
tion standards. As fertility declines, a conflict is created between the
inherited tastes and the peer group influences, and the rate at which
there is a shift from one to the other would be determined by the size
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Techniques of Control
Like the above, techniques of control could also be interpreted
through the inert area framework. Namely, the set of controls normally
used would be surrounded by inert areas; but, as sufficient pressure is
generated and new techniques are introduced, the new techniques grad-
ually become part of the option set of the techniques available. Those
with the narrowest inert areas are likely to become the initial adopters.
(For an innovation adoption model along these lines, see Leibenstein
[1976, pp. 234-39].) One could visualize a variety of stages between
old techniques and new ones, representing different degrees of knowl-
edge and confidence. We would not expect that the new techniques to
become part of the demand for control until they become noticed, gen-
erally known, and tried.
Rationality Increase as a Factor in Fertility Determination
The existing theory does not allow for changes in degrees of rational-
ity in determining eventual fertility decline. Clearly, if a maximizing
model is used, this forecloses any increase in rationality. But the degree
of rationality may depend on the diffusion of responsibility within which
the nuclear family finds itself. Thus, if the nuclear family is part of an
extended family in which there is considerable diffusion of responsibil-
ity for children and for economic well-being of household members,
then there will be little pressure toward a high degree of rationality. As
we obtain a shift toward the nuclear family as a separate independent
unit and responsibility for economic welfare of the household becomes
concentrated, then there is likely to be increased pressure for rational
behavior. Exogenous influences, such as the gradual spread of seculari-
zation through modern education, will also result in an increase in
rationality. In particular, as nuclear families become more responsible
for their own welfare, the inert areas that surround their critical choice
variables become narrower, and hence they respond to pressure with
less inertia.
Comment Warren C. Sanderson
Economic theory teaches us that competition among producers usually
benefits consumers. Competition among producers of economic models
of fertility behavior is no different. Even though the market is dominated
Warren C. Sanderson is associated with the Department of Economics at Stan-
ford University.141 Toward a More General Model of Fertility Determination
by two large producers, the Pennsylvania school and the "Chicago-Co-
lumbia" school, the contest to produce a model that more economists
would buy has resulted not only in a substantial improvement in the
models themselves, but in a number of valuable "spinoff" developments
as welJ.l This essay by Easterlin, Pollak, and Wachter is the formal
presentation of the 1976 Pennsylvania school model with a full descrip-
tion of all its novel features and a discussion of why it is superior to
what the competition has to offer.
The paper focuses on three features of the new model: "endogenous
preferences," supply side factors, and consideration of behavior under
imperfect information. I shall comment briefly on each of the three.
"Endogenous preferences" is not a new feature of the 1976 Pennsyl-
vania school model. Quite the contrary, it has been standard equipment
on Pennsylvania school models since 1966.2 What motivates its discus-
sion in the paper, then, is not its novelty, but the manner in which the
competition has reacted to its introduction. The members of the Chicago-
Columbia school not only have refused to incorporate this feature into
their own models, they have positively rejected it as being dangerous to
the health of economic theory.
Before continuing the discussion of the "endogenous preferences"
specification, it is useful to note that the contending models are not
nearly so different as their producers might lead us to suppose. First of
all, in the context of a single generation, preferences are just as exoge-
nous in the 1976 Pennsylvania school model as they are in any of the
Chicago-Columbia school models. Current preferences and behavior are
not simultaneously determined in the models of either large producer.
There is a difference between the two types of models when dealing
with fertility change over the course of several generations. In the Penn-
sylvania school models since 1966, preferences change generation by
generation in a manner determined within the model. Until recently this
stood in sharp contrast to the Chicago-Columbia school models, which
maintained that preferences were invariant over time. With the publica-
tion of Stigler and Becker (1977) even this difference narrowed. Stigler
and Becker argued that tastes are truly invariant, but that household
production structures vary over time and space. Therefore consumers
now seem to have a choice between a model that deals with intergener-
ational fertility changes within a framework in which preferences vary
and the household production structure does not, and a framework in
which the household production structure varies and preferences do not.
That preferences vary both across time and across cultures is plau-
sible enough. Certainly, as the authors argue, this view should not be
discarded on theoretical grounds. The same can be said, however, with
regard to household production structures. Perhaps one day a combina-
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The second aspect of the 1976 Pennsylvania school model featured
in the paper is concern with the biological aspects of fertility behavior.
In section 2.2 a births function and a deaths function are introduced
into a formal economic model of fertility, and in section 2.3 the concepts
of natural fertility and the difference between desired and achieved fer-
tility are incorporated into an economic framework. Again, the best
context in which to understand these contributions is that of the compe-
tition between the two rival schools of economists. Scholars have pro-
duced substantial bodies of literature on the biological determinants of
fertility and on the biological and behavioral correlates of infant mor-
tality. These go far beyond anything found in this paper. One contribu-
tion of the 1976 model, then, is the integration of past demographic
findings into an economic context. Demographers may find little new
here, but in the competition between the two large producers, the Penn-
sylvania school has scored a success in aligning itself somewhat more
closely with the results of previous demographic research.
In the same vein, section 2.3 can best be read as criticism of the
competition for not incorporating the biological aspects of fertility be-
havior into their formal model. Without this perspective, a substantial
portion of that section may seem rather puzzling. For example, a long
argument is made to demonstrate that there are indeed some contempo-
rary cultures in which the volitional practice of fertility control is vir-
tually absent; but there are very few social scientists, if there are any at
all, who would contest this point. The rationale of the argument be-
comes clear when it is viewed as a warning to economists not to use
other models in those contexts where the biological aspects of fertility
are likely to be important.
The third aspect of the 1976 Pennsylvania school model highlighted
in the paper is the notion of behavior under imperfect information. Each
couple is viewed as choosing a pattern of goods consumption, time
allocation, fertility, and infant mortality that, subject to resource and
technology constraints, maximizes their utility. The problem with adopt-
ing this view naively, as the authors point out, is that people are often
ignorant of the consequences on fertility and infant mortality of various
seemingly unrelated aspects of their behavior. To make their model
more realistic, the authors suggest that couples be treated as if they
maximized their utility subject to their resources, household technology,
and possibly incorrect beliefs about the determinants of their experience
of fertility and infant mortality. These couples are then assumed to
maintain all other aspects of their behavior invariant even though the
resulting family size is different from the one they anticipated.
This specification has two serious drawback5. The first, mentioned by
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depend on actual family size as opposed to a hypothetical family size
that never materializes. The second problem is more technical in nature.
Since the family's consumption alternatives may depend on the earnings
of children, it may not be possible to hold all other aspects of behavior
constant when the actual family size is substantially below the antici-
pated one. In economic argot, the procedure proposed in the paper to
deal with the problem of imperfect information is not guaranteed to
result in feasible solutions. New models often have bugs in them, and
I am confident that future technological advances will result in a prefer-
able treatment of behavior under imperfect information.
My final comments concern the formal economic model presented in
section 2.2 and its relationship to the arguments made in the other sec-
tions of the paper. It is important to note here that although the authors
present an economic model of fertility behavior, they never use the
model in the framework of a comparative statics analysis. This is a bit
like creating an intriguing piece of machinery one never intends to use.
The art in creating microeconomic behavioral models is in abstracting
from all but the most important factors in a given problem so that the
analysis of the model results in falsifiable implications. The model in
section 2.2 is not constructed on this principle. Instead, it is specified
so generally that in its present form it has no unambiguous implications
when any of the exogenous variables are altered one at a time.
Since the model is consistent with almost any kind of behavior, it
offers no guidance on what is plausible and what is not. For example,
in section 2.3 there are three graphs concerning desired fertility-one
in which it is drawn as an increasing function of nonlabor income, one
in which it is drawn as invariant with respect to socioeconomic status,
and one in which it is drawn as either a constant or a decreasing func-
tion of social and economic development. The model is certainly con-
sistent with all three graphs. Indeed, the model is consistent with desired
fertility being a decreasing function of nonlabor income (even if desired
fertility is a "normal" good), a sinosoidal function of socioeconomic
status, and an inverted V-shaped function of social and economic devel-
opment. In other words, the model in section 2.2 has less substantive
connection with what is said in the other parts of the paper than one
might wish.
In conclusion, then, I reiterate that this paper is the product of a
competitive struggle between two rival producers of economic models
of fertility behavior. It contains not only explicit criticisms of alternative
models, but numerous implicit criticisms. Although some of the argu-
ments may seem either arcane or pointless to the nonspecialist, they are
all aimed at perceived weaknesses in the Chicago-Columbia school's
product lines.144 Richard A. Easterlin/Robert A. Pollak/Michael L. Wachter
Will the 1976 Pennsylvania school model come to dominate the mar-
ket? It is not clear. After all, different people have different tastes/
production functions (choose one or both) when it comes to the formu-
lation and use of economic models of fertility behavior.
Notes
1. For example, Easterlin (1974), Sanderson (1974), and Stigler and Becker
(1977).
2. Endogenous preferences were first introduced into the Pennsylvania school's
models in Easterlin (1966).
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